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CERTAINTY, EFFICIENCY, AND REALISM:
RIGHTS IN COLLATERAL UNDER
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
MARGIT LIVINGSTON*
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires that
the debtor have "rights in the collateral" for the attachment of
a security interest. The drafters of the Code, however, left the
determination of this phrase's meaning to the courts. The Ar-
ticle 9 Study Committee recently declined to recommend any
changes in the existing requirement.
In this Article, Professor Margit Livingston argues that
the requirement of "rights in the collateral" is unnecessary as
it relates to tangible goods and should be deleted from Article
9. As an alternative to the uncertainty engendered by the
phrase, Professor Livingston would substitute a set of notice
and priority rules that more clearly define the rights and obli-
gations of the parties undertaking an Article 9 transaction in-
volving tangible goods. Professor Livingston concludes by
observing that Karl Llewellyn's philosophy of Legal Realism
would best be served by such an amendment.
The Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated originally to
simplify and clarify commercial law and to facilitate the planning
and execution of commercial transactions.' The Code's drafters
and later commentators considered Article 9, covering secured trans-
actions, the best integrated and most carefully conceived of the
Code's provisions.2 They believed that its clarity and precision
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1971; M.A., 1976, J.D., 1975, University of Minnesota; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1979.
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the DePaul University Col-
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this Article.
1. The Code states that its underlying purposes are, among others, "to simplify, clar-
ify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a)
(1991).
2. As one commentator describes the accomplishment,
Article 9 ... is considered by many to be the signal achievement of the Code.
Taking the confused state of prior law relating to chattel mortgages and condi-
tional sales, the Reporters reduced to black letter principles a Code which permit-
ted easy and effective financing secured by accounts receivable and chattels,
including inventories.
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promoted certainty and stability in the rules governing secured
lending.3
However, even the most thoughtfully drafted statute cannot an-
ticipate every possible scenario, and in some cases deliberate ambigu-
ity is desirable. One of the requirements for an attached security
interest-that the debtor have "rights in the collateral"-was pur-
posely left somewhat vague4 on the assumption either that no further
elaboration was necessary or that the courts were in a better position
to flesh out its meaning in the context of specific situations.5 This
choice in favor of generality has produced extensive confusion in the
case law and has resulted in a serious warping of some of the theoreti-
Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 374 (1983).
Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of Article 9, recounted the drafting com-
mittee's high expectations regarding the unifying and simplifying effect of Article 9 on
secured transactions law:
Pre-Code personal property security law may be described as closely resembling
that obscure wood in which Dante discovered the gates of hell. We thought that,
with a little pruning and clearing, we could turn the obscure wood into a peoples
park where widows and orphans and country bankers could enjoy their innocent
pleasures, safe from the attack of ravening wild beasts and trustees in bankruptcy.
The sad truth is that personal property security law is well on the way to becom-
ing quite as fragmented and quite as complex as it ever was in the bad old days
before the Code.
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Con-
fessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 620 (1981) [hereinafter Gilmore,
Confessions].
3. Professor Karl Llewellyn, in an early article on the codification of security law,
noted the considerable disadvantages created by the helter-skelter collection of pre-Code
statutes and case law governing security devices: "What is not minor is the price in com-
plexity, inconvenience, and often in unfairness which must be paid when legal patterns of
happenstance origin are taken in all their history-ridden detail as the basis for the doing of
remodeling jobs which are themselves piece-work." Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codi-
fying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 687, 688 (1948).
4. U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (1991) states only that " 'rights' includes remedies."
5. The 1962 version of § 9-204(2) defined "rights in the collateral" for some specific
types of property:
(2) For the purposes of this section the debtor has no rights
(a) in crops until they are planted or otherwise become growing crops, in the
young of livestock until they are conceived;
(b) in fish until caught, in oil, gas or minerals until they are extracted, in
timber until it is cut;
(c) in a contract right until the contract has been made;
(d) in an account until it comes into existence.
U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1962). With the 1972 Amendments to Article 9, the drafters
deleted this list: "Former subsection (2) has been eliminated as unnecessary and
in some cases confusing. Its operation appeared to be arbitrary, and it is believed
that the questions considered are best left to the courts." Official Reasons for the
1972 Change, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 3 U.L.A. 280 (1981).
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cal underpinnings of Article 9. Parties to secured transactions and
others dealing with the debtor are left uncertain about what the law
requires, and some of the litigated cases have yielded arguably unfair
results.
The Article 9 Study Committee recently completed its review of
Article 9 and concluded that amendments to the existing uniform stat-
ute are warranted in several areas.6 The Committee, however, recom-
mended no change in the existing requirement that the debtor have
rights in the collateral for the purpose of attachment of a security in-
terest.7 The Committee acknowledged that "from time to time both
courts and commentators have misunderstood the meaning and impli-
cations of this requirement,"8 but felt that "these problems do not
warrant revision of Article 9."9 The Committee believed that because
many of the general conveyancing principles defining the rights of
third parties (such as purchasers) are derived from non-Code property
law, they require no further elaboration within Article 9 itself.10
This Article criticizes the Study Committee's conclusion that
amendment of the phrase "rights in the collateral" is not necessary
and argues that the concept should be eliminated from Article 9, at
least as it pertains to tangible goods. The notion of rights in the collat-
eral has obscured the real issues in these cases: first, whether a partic-
ular claimant has an enforceable interest in particular property of the
debtor, and second, if two or more parties have such interests, what
relative priority exists among them. Unlike the Study Committee, I
conclude that Article 9 should address these questions directly, rather
than rely on non-Code property law.
Part I of this Article outlines the basic requirements for creation
of an enforceable security interest and then focuses on the confusion
generated by the requirement that the debtor have rights in the collat-
eral, particularly when the collateral consists of tangible goods.'1 Part
II examines the issue more specifically in cases in which the debtor
has possession of goods that it does not own outright.' 2 Part III dis-
6. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB Study Group:
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Article 9, at 18-42 (1992).
7. Id. at 94.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 95.
10. Id. The Committee did recommend, however, that the Permanent Editorial Board
"seriously consider revising the official comments or issuing a PEB Commentary to deal
with problems associated with the relationship of these conveyancing principles to Article
9." Id. at 96.
11. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 46-212 and accompanying text.
1994]
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cusses the converse situation in which the debtor lacks possession of
the goods but arguably has some rights in them.13 Part IV suggests
that much of the confusion and inconsistency in the case law could be
reduced by eliminating the concept of rights in the collateral as it re-
lates to tangible goods14 and substituting a set of notice and priority
rules that define the rights and obligations of the most common par-
ties to these transactions.1 - Finally, Part V explores the impact of Karl
Llewellyn's realist jurisprudence on the Code and argues that Llewel-
lyn's own jurisprudential goals would best be served by statutorily
amending this section of Article 9.16
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
To have a security interest enforceable against the debtor's assets,
a lender must fulfill the requirements for attachment under section 9-
203(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code.17 Until the security interest
attaches, it is not enforceable against the debtor.'8 The requirements
for attachment consist essentially of a written security agreement
signed by the debtor and describing the collateral,' 9 the giving of
value by the secured party,20 and the debtor's having rights in the col-
13. See infra notes 213-52 and accompanying text.
14. This Article does not attempt to address the issue of rights in the collateral as it
relates to collateral other than tangible goods. The issue is framed differently for collateral
other than tangible goods, such as accounts, general intangibles, chattel paper, and docu-
ments. For these intangible and semi-intangible forms of collateral, courts tend to focus
less on whether possession and ownership are separated and whether the facts raise an
equitable estoppel issue, and more on whether the property in question has come into
existence (e.g., has an account receivable been created?) and whether the debtor has tradi-
tional ownership rights in the property (e.g., the right to alienate it). See, e.g., September-
tide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing
accounts and contract rights); In re GRF, Inc., 119 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)
(addressing liquor license); In re Clark, 96 B.R. 605, 608 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (address-
ing liquor license); Krohn v. Omni-Veterinary Supply Co. (In re Nash), 70 B.R. 40, 42
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (analyzing stock shares); Franke v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
509 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (evaluating certificate of deposit); North Supply
Co. v. Allco Fin. Servs., 728 P.2d 912,915 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (analyzing rights in account).
15. See infra notes 253-307 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 308-39 and accompanying text.
17. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1991) ("[A] security interest is not enforceable against the
debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless [the three
following elements are satisfied]."); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
18. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1991).
19. Id. at (a). In lieu of a written security agreement, the collateral may be "in the
possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement"-a condition describing a pledge
made under an oral or written contract. Id. The requirement of a writing or possession by
the secured party satisfies Statute of Frauds and evidentiary concerns. Id. at cmts. 3, 5.
20. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1991). Unless the secured party has given value to the
debtor, presumably the debtor has no repayment obligation that could be secured by the
collateral.
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lateral.2 Both "security agreement" 22 and "value"'  are defined else-
where in the Code, but the drafters left "rights in the collateral"
undefined.24
In its simplest sense the requirement that the debtor have rights
in the collateral before the security interest can attach follows intui-
tively from the idea that "you can't alienate what you don't own."'
Just as the common law recognized that a thief could not pass good
21. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1991).
22. A security agreement is defined as "an agreement which creates or provides for a
security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(1) (1991). Article I defines "agreement" as "the bar-
gain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circum-
stances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided
in this Act." Id. § 1-201(3). Thus defined, a security agreement need not be in writing, but
the language of § 9-203(1)(a), by requiring that the agreement be signed by the debtor and
contain a description of the collateral, implies that a security agreement for non-possessory
security interests must be in writing. See In re Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924, 926 (3d Cir.
1980); American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 196 A.2d 150, 152 (R.I. 1963); BARKLEY CLARK,
THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2.02
(2d ed. 1988).
23. "Value" includes at its most basic level "any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract." U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d) (1991). Article 1 also defines "value" more specif-
ically; for example, "value" can be "a binding commitment to extend credit or for the
extension of immediately available credit." Id. § 1-201(44)(a).
24. Grant Gilmore, one of the original reporters for Article 9, noted that "[t]he Article
does not specify the quantum of 'rights' which a debtor must have in collateral to support a
security interest." 1 GRANT GiLMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY,
§ 11.5, at 353 (1965) [hereinafter GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS].
There is also scant law review literature on the subject of rights in the collateral. Ex-
isting commentary includes Ralph C. Anzivino, When Does a Debtor Have Rights in the
Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 23 (1977)
(arguing that the debtor has rights in the collateral when it has both possession and the
ability to transfer good title to goods); Steven W. Sanford, Debtor's Rights in Collateral as a
Requirement for Attachment of a Security Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 26
S.D. L. REv. 163 (1981) (concluding that non-Code and Code law outside of Article 9
basically define what constitutes rights in the collateral); Joseph W. Thrner, Comment,
Rights in Collateral Under U.C.C. § 9-203, 54 Mo. L. RPv. 677 (1989) (providing an over-
view of the topic).
Most treatise writers have also paid only cursory attention to the issue. See CLARK,
supra note 22, S 2.04; RICHARD F. DUNCAN ET AL., THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS § 2.03[2] (1992); 1 GILMORE supra, § 11.5, at 352-53; RAY D. HENSON,
HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-
2, at 59-60 (2d ed. 1979); ELDON H. REILEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 3.02[5] (1993); JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-6, at 986-91 (3d ed. 1988).
A few scholarly treatises have probed the issue in greater depth. See 1 PETER F. Coo-
oAN Er AL., Debtor's Rights in Collateral as a Requirement for Attachment of a Security
Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4B-1 (Supp. 1991); ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COM-
MON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 18 (1985).
25. United States v. Ables, 739 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (D. Kan. 1990) (quoting KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 84-9-203, Kansas Comment 1983, at 417).
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title to stolen property even to a bona fide purchaser for value,26 a
thief should not be able to give a valid security interest in stolen chat-
tel.27 The thief has no title, leasehold, license, or other contractual or
property interest that will support the conveyance of a security inter-
est to a lenderm 8
A corollary to this first premise is that, in general, one cannot
convey to another greater rights in property than one has.29 For ex-
ample, if A leases an airplane from B, A normally has the right to
exclusive use of the airplane during the term of the leasehold, pro-
vided that the conditions of the lease, including the payment of rent,
are satisfied. 0 If A in turn gives a security interest in the leased air-
plane to C, C's rights in the airplane can be no greater than A's.31 In
other words, C's rights are derived from A's. If C forecloses on its
security interest, C steps into A's shoes and assumes A's rights and
obligations under the lease-e.g., the right to use the airplane during
the term of the lease and the obligation to pay rent.
In some cases, however, the transferee of property can acquire
rights greater than those of the transferor. The two principal means
by which this enlargement of rights occurs in the secured lending con-
26. Professor Hawkland has noted that
[i]f a thief stole goods from the true owner, he, the thief, acquired nothing ("void"
title), and the true owner remained with full ownership rights and not with a mere
equity of rescission. The sale by the thief to a bona fide purchaser did not affect
these rights in this situation.
2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-403:01 (1992).
27. First Nat'l Bank v. Avondale Mills Bevelle Employees Fed. Credit Union, 967 F.2d
556, 559 (11th Cir. 1992).
28. Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C. App. 1971); McDonald's
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ind. App. 1978); Inmi-Etti v. Alvisi, 492
A.2d 917, 923 (Md. App. 1985); Bay Springs Forest Prods., Inc. v. Wade, 435 So. 2d 690,
694 (Miss. 1983); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (NJ. 1980); Mattson v. Commer-
cial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 723 P.2d 996, 999 (Or. 1986) (en banc).
29. This principle, sometimes referred to by the Latin phrase nemo dat quod non habet
(one cannot give away what one does not have), is supposed to foster security of property,
that is, to prevent disturbance of private property rights without the owner's permission.
See John F. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework- Conveyancing Principles and Property Inter-
ests, 59 B.U. L. REv. 811, 812-13 (1979); Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954) [hereinafter Gilmore, Good Faith
Purchasers]; Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 2, at 606; see also Bank of the West v. Com-
mercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Secured party] can
have no greater rights in the collateral than its debtor.").
30. This example is derived from a problem in DOUGLAs G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.
JACKSON, SECURITY INTER=EsT IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 169-170 (2d ed. 1987). See also
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of
the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 203-04 n.85 (1983) [hereinafter Baird & Jack-
son, Possession and Ownership] (offering another example).
31. "A security interest can attach only to the extent of the debtor's interest." South-
west Georgia Prod. Credit Ass'n v. James, 350 S.E.2d 786, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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text are consent and estoppel. In the first instance, the debtor itself
may not own suitable collateral, but another individual may be willing
to provide property acceptable to the secured party as collateral. The
owner of this property could consent to the debtor's encumbering the
property in favor of the lender and thereby grant the debtor some
"rights" in the property short of full ownership. 2 If the secured party
forecloses, it takes the collateral free and clear of any interest of the
debtor or the owner. Thus the debtor's limited right to encumber the
property could ultimately result in the secured party's full ownership
of the property.
Estoppel provides another legal theory by which the secured
party's rights in the collateral become more extensive than those of
the debtor. The concept of estoppel is recognized both under general
equitable principles and in the Uniform Commercial Code itself.
Under common law estoppel, the owner of property loses the ability
to assert its ownership rights if it allows a debtor to use and control
the property in such a way that third parties, such as creditors, are
justifiably deceived into thinking that the debtor owns the property in
question.33 Thus once again the debtor's limited right to use or pos-
sess the owner's property expands in the secured party's hands to the
right of foreclosure and, ultimately, full ownership.
Statutory estoppel stems from the Uniform Commercial Code's
various bona fide purchaser doctrines. For example, under section 2-
403 "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to
a good faith purchaser for value."' 34 Thus if X buys equipment from Y
and pays for it with a check that is later dishonored, X acquires voida-
ble title to the equipment and can give a valid security interest to a
secured party who acts in good faith.3" That security interest, when
enforced against X, will be superior to Y's right to void the sale to X.
36
32. See, e.g., K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 345,348 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Washington Trust Co., 386 A.2d 1096,
1098-99 (R.I. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 393 N.W.2d 458, 460 (S.D. 1986).
33. See, e.g., Preston v. Witherspoon, 9 N.E. 585, 588 (Ind. 1886); Drew v. Kimball, 43
N.H. 282,288 (1861); American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Winder, 150 S.E. 489,491 (N.C. 1929);
Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548,551 (Okla. 1969); O'Connor's Adm'x v. Clark,
32 A. 1029, 1030 (Pa. 1895).
34. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1991).
35. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); National Pawnbrokers Unlimited v. Osterman, Inc.
(In re Return of Property in State v. Pippin), 500 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
36. Ledbetter v. Darwin Dobbs Co., 473 So. 2d 197,202 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Jordan
v. Butler, 156 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Neb. 1968); Cox v. Gerald Modell, Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1200, 1202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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At first glance these principles seem well defined enough to guide
courts in determining whether the debtor has sufficient rights in the
collateral for attachment of a security interest. However, the case law
reveals that courts have been prone to ignore these principles in some
instances and to misapply them in others. Some courts have refused
to recognize that a debtor's limited rights in property can constitute
rights in the collateral within the meaning of section 9-203(1)(c). 37
Others have used a debtor's limited rights in property as a spring-
board to give the secured party priority over a competing claimant,
often the owner of the property, instead of limiting the secured party's
rights to those of the debtor. 8
In both situations the ignorance or misapplication of the Code's
basic principles can have pernicious effects on debtors, secured credi-
tors, and others involved with the debtor's business. Courts rejecting
limited ownership rights as rights in the collateral for Article 9 pur-
poses eliminate a potential source of security for debtors holding
those rights. 9 This restriction may result in the unavailability of
credit to these debtors or the imposition of higher interest rates.
Courts accepting limited rights as rights in the collateral have created
a hidden rule of priority between secured creditors and titleholders
that contradicts Article 9's stated goal of enhancing the certainty and
predictability of commercial transactions.40
37. See, e.g., Rohweder v. Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765 F.2d 109,112-13 (8th Cir.
1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 208 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Wis. 1973), overruled on other
grounds, Daniel v. Bank of Hayward, 425 N.W.2d 416 (Wis. 1988).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Ables, 739 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (D. Kan. 1990); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Quality Inns, 735 F. Supp. 1311, 1317-18 (D. Md. 1990); Litwiller
Mach. & Mfg. v. NBD Alpena Bank, 457 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam); Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1528, 1531 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
39. For example, equipment leasing has grown tremendously over the last twenty
years, and often a debtor will hold much of its heavy equipment pursuant to long-term
leases. Presumably the leasehold interests, if assignable, could be quite valuable as poten-
tial security. See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Personal Property Leasing: A Chal-
lenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605 (1981) (arguing for uniform statutory treatment of personal
property leasing).
40. Professors White and Summers have noted the sub silentio rule of priority created
by some judicial decisions interpreting the phrase "rights in the collateral":
[E]quities between competing claimants may be fought out in the name of this
phrase. And the time when a court determines that the debtor acquired rights in
the collateral may not only depend on such equities, but also on the nature of the
competing parties and the kind of law involved. In such cases, judges should be
alert to the possibility that they may be deploying the phrase "rights in the collat-
eral" as a priority determining device, and that the phrase was not, as such, in-
tended to have that function.
WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, § 22-6, at 990-91.
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A review of the case law in this area reveals the confusion, incon-
sistency, and doctrinal distortion resulting from application and mis-
application of the principles discussed above. While some
inconsistency is inevitable when courts interpreting the Code are
called upon to flesh out nebulous concepts such as "reasonableness" 41
or "unconscionability,"42 this degree of uncertainty may be intolerable
when the issue pertains to the very existence of a security interest-
i.e., whether the secured party has an enforceable interest in the prop-
erty in question.43
Contested cases involving rights in collateral consisting of tangi-
ble goods generally involve those in which the debtor had possession
of goods that it did not own outright and those in which the debtor
lacked possession of goods in which it had some interest, up to full
ownership. Cases in which the debtor has both possession and full
ownership,44 or in which the debtor has neither possession nor any
41. The terms "reasonable" and "reasonably" are used throughout the Uniform Com-
mercial Code but are not defined therein. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-105 (describing parties'
rights to choice of law); 1-201(37) (defining security interest); 2-706 (concerning seller's
resale of goods after buyer's breach); 2-712 (providing for buyer's cover); 7-308 (regarding
enforcement of carrier's lien); 9-504(3) (describing methods for disposition of repossessed
collateral) (1991). One may speculate that the Code's drafters employed the standard of
reasonableness when they believed that factual circumstances would impinge heavily on
what constitutes appropriate behavior by the parties. For example, U.C.C. § 2-602(1)
(1991) gives buyers a "reasonable" time to reject goods after their delivery or tender.
Professors White and Summers have suggested that what constitutes a reasonable time
may vary according to four factual circumstances: "(1) the difficulty of discovering the
defect, (2) the terms of the contract, (3) the relative perishability of the goods, and (4) the
course of performance after the sale and before the formal rejection." WHrrE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 24, § 8.3, at 362.
42. The courts may refuse to enforce any unconscionable contract or portion thereof.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1991). Again, specific factual circumstances will strongly influence
whether a particular contract is unconscionable. The Official Comment to this section
states that "It]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of
the contract." Id. at cmt. 1.
43. The timing of attachment can also be important because it determines priorities
between two secured parties where neither has filed or perfected its security interest,
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1991), and because it has an effect on the creation of a preferential
transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (e)(2) (1988).
44. CLARK, supra note 22, 2.04 ("If the debtor owns the collateral outright, it is
obvious that the'security interest may attach. ... "). Despite Professor Clark's unequivocal
statement, one may assume that the issue is its most "obvious" when the debtor has both
ownership and possession. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank v. Overseas Motosport, 563 P.2d
414, 417 (Kan. 1977) (holding that title and physical possession are sufficient to give a
debtor rights in the collateral).
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property or contractual interest, are rarely litigated.4" Few courts
would dispute that in the former situation the debtor has rights in the
collateral or that in the latter situation it does not. It is the cases in
the middle that have vexed courts and commentators alike.
II. OSTENSIBLE OWNERSHIP THROUGH POSSESSION
In many instances the debtor will acquire possession of goods to
which it does not have title. Consignments, leases, sales on approval,
sales or return, and bailments all involve possession of goods without
full ownership. The purpose of the debtor's possession is normally
defined by the agreement between the debtor and the owner of the
property. In a consignment the debtor typically acts as a type of sell-
ing agent for the consignor, taking possession of the consignor's goods
as part of the consignee's efforts to sell them to customers.46 In a
lease the debtor leases goods, usually equipment, for use in its own
business.47 In a sale on approval the debtor takes possession of goods
that it intends to examine with an eye toward ultimate purchase.48 A
sale or return, like a consignment, involves transfer of the goods to the
debtor for the purpose of finding an ultimate buyer for them.49 Theo-
retically, the seller in a sale or return, unlike in a consignment, trans-
45. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 24, 1 18.06[l], at 18-48 ("Since one cannot convey
what one does not have, a debtor cannot create a security interest in property in which he
has no rights.").
46. See General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 199 N.E.2d 326, 327-28 (Mass.
1964); Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 175 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Wis. 1970). See generally
William D. Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Coam.
L.J. 146, 146 (1962).
47. Article 2A defines "lease" as "a transfer of the right to possession and use of
goods for a term in return for consideration." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (1991); see also In re
Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (holding that a lessee only
acquires the right to use of the property), affd, 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Telemax
Corp., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 742, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that a lessee
does not acquire an option to purchase the leased goods); Homer Kripke, Some Dissonant
Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 791, 795 (1988) (stating that a lessor has a future
interest in his leased goods, including the right to reclaim or repossess them on default);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9
Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv.
683, 690 (1988) (explaining that a lessee pays consideration in exchange for the use of
lessor's goods until expiration of the lease term).
48. U.C.C. § 2-326(1) (1991) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, if delivered
goods may be returned by the buyer even though they conform to the contract, the transac-
tion is... a 'sale on approval' if the goods are delivered primarily for use." See Valley
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah 1974).
49. A sales transaction in which the buyer has the right to return conforming goods is
a " 'sale or return' if the goods are delivered primarily for resale." U.C.C. § 2-326(1)(b)
(1991).
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fers "title" to the goods to the debtor upon delivery, but it is title
subject to defeasance if the debtor is unable to sell the goods.5"
In a bailment, the bailor gives the bailee possession of goods for a
specified purpose.51 Upon fulfillment of the purpose, the bailee rede-
livers the goods to the bailor or handles them according to the bailor's
instructions.52 The purpose of a bailment can vary as much as the
kind of the goods involved. The bailor may instruct a bailee to store
goods, repair them, refurbish them, care for them, or manufacture
them into another product. In its broadest sense, the term "bailment"
includes leases and consignments as well-a lessee takes possession of
goods from the lessor for the purpose of using them in its business; a
consignee takes possession of goods for the purpose of selling them on
the consignor's behalf.
A. Analysis under the Code
1. Leases and Consignments
In lease or consignment cases, courts rarely discuss the rights-in-
collateral issue. Usually, the party claiming to be the true "owner" of
the collateral-i.e., the lessor or consignor-and the secured party of
the lessee or consignee assert competing claims. The courts do not ask
whether the debtor has "rights" in the leased or consigned property
sufficient for attachment. Instead they examine whether the lease or
consignment is a "true" one or one designed for security purposes
(sometimes called a disguised security transaction).
If a lease or consignment is in reality a secured transaction, then
the outcome of the case depends on the Article 9 priority rules. A
lease or consignment designed for security purposes is subject to all
the requirements of Article 9,53 including attachment and perfection.
The lessor/consignor's interest, once denominated an Article 9 secur-
ity interest, must be perfected to have priority over a competing per-
fected secured party.54 Very often the lessor or consignor will not
have complied with Article 9 filing requirements and thereby will lose
50. See American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 476 P.2d 573, 576 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1970).
51. Zwagerman v. Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Zwagerman), 115 B.R. 540, 547
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 125 B.R. 486 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
52. Id.; Uni-Products, Inc. v. Bearse (In re Uni-Products, Inc.), 153 B.R. 764, 767
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
53. Article 9 applies to "security interests created by contract including... [a] lease or
consignment intended as security." U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1991).
54. In general, between two secured parties, the first to file or perfect, whichever oc-
curs earlier, has priority. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1991).
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to the secured party with a perfected security interest in the lessee/
consignee's equipment or inventory.-5
Whether the consignee or lessee in a consignment or lease
designed for security has sufficient rights in the collateral rarely arises
because courts assume that a security consignment or lease is really a
sale of the property involved. As the buyer of the property, the con-
signee or lessee has "title" to it as well as possession of it.5 6 Title and
possession have been assumed to be sufficient rights for attachment.5 7
The consignor's or lessor's reservation of title amounts to the reserva-
tion of a security interest only, with the remainder of the bundle of
rights being accorded to the consignee or lessee.5 8
In "true" consignments or leases, the courts similarly skirt the is-
sue of whether the consignee or lessee has sufficient rights in the con-
signed or leased property to trigger attachment of a security interest.
In these transactions, the owner's retention of title is not a security
device as such, but simply a reflection of the owner's property interest
in the goods and the recipient's correspondingly limited interest.
The Code treats true leases differently from true consignments
with respect to public notification requirements.5 9 Because true leases
are almost totally exempt from the filing requirements of Article 9,60
55. See, e.g., James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn.
1972) (applying rule to purported lease); Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 229 S.E.2d 278, 283
(N.C. 1976) (applying rule to purported consignment); Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach.
Co., 631 P.2d 389, 396 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (analyzing purported lease).
56. Generally, "title" to goods in a sales transaction passes from seller to buyer when
"the seller completes his performance with reference to physical delivery of the goods,
despite any reservation of a security interest." U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1991).
57. See supra note 44.
58. Article 2 expressly states that "[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller of the
title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reserva-
tion of a security interest." U.C.C. § 2401(1) (1991). The drafters have created, in effect,
a tautology: by designating the former owner's interest as a security interest, they imply
that attachment has taken place (assuming a sufficient writing) either upon delivery of the
goods to the recipient or at some earlier point. Since attachment has occurred, the recipi-
ent/debtor must have "rights" in the property encumbered within the meaning of U.C.C.
§ 9-203(1)(c) (1991).
59. For cases stating that a lessee's interest in leased goods constitutes sufficient rights
for attachment of a lender's security interest, see Holiday Airlines Corp. v. World Airways,
Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 647 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1146 (1982) (by implication); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Michigan Bank, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 745,750 (Mich. 1972). But see Holiday Airlines Corp., supra, at 983 (dissenting opin-
ion); Disch v. Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 561 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
60. Lessors of fixtures must make a fixture filing to have priority over the conflicting
claim of an encumbrancer or owner of real estate to which the fixtures are annexed.
U.C.C. § 2A-309(4) (1991); see also HENSON, supra note 24, § 3-12, at 44 (stating that the
parties to a "lease" often intend a secured transaction, but if a legitimate lease is created,
no Article 9 filing is necessary).
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the dispute between a lessor and its lessee's secured party does not
usually center on whether the lessee has rights in the leased goods
sufficient to support attachment of a security interest. Regardless of
whether the security interest attaches, the lessor will still have the su-
perior position by virtue of its title retention. 1
Unlike true leases, true or non-security consignments are brought
into Article 9 by Article 2. Section 2-326 deems certain types of con-
signments to be sale or return transactions.6' Goods held under sale
or return are subject to the, claims of the "buyer's" creditors while in
the buyer's possession.63 The consignor can avoid having the consign-
ment deemed a sale or return by complying with one of three options,
each of which ensures that the consignee's creditors were or should
have been made aware of the consignor's interest.64 The consignor's
safest option involves filing an Article 9 financing statement listing the
consignor as the secured party, the consignee as the debtor, and the
consigned goods as the collateral.6
61. Article 2A provides that, in general, "a creditor of a lessee takes subject to the
lease contract." U.C.C. § 2A-307(1) (1991).
62. Section 2-326(3) provides:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains a place
of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other
than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims of credi-
tors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or
return.
U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1991). In the normal consignment transaction the consignor does de-
liver goods to the consignee for the purpose of resale to end users, and the consignee will
run the business under its own name rather than under the consignor's name. This type of
transaction is typical of certain trades, such as the jewelry business. See Ingrid M. Hil-
linger, The Treatment of Consignments in Bankruptcy: Two Codes and Their Fictions, at
Play, in the Fields, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 73, 73-74 (1989). Sometimes the "consignment" in-
volves more of a true agency because the consignee does not maintain a fixed place of
business at which he deals in that type of goods. See Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 692-93
(Utah 1980).
63. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1991).
64. The consignor can comply with an applicable sign law that allows its interest to be
evidenced by a sign posted at the consignee's place of business; establish that the consignee
is generally known by its creditors to be engaged in the business of selling consigned goods;
or file an Article 9 financing statement. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1991). Article 9 itself provides
for the filing of precautionary financing statements by consignors and lessors using appro-
priate terminology. Id. § 9-408.
65. William D. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5:
Consignments and Equipment Leases, 77 COM. L.J. 108, 109 (1972). In addition to the
normal Article 9 filing, the consignor may have to take additional steps to protect itself
against the interests of prior inventory secured parties. If the consignee's secured creditors
have previously filed financing statements covering the consignee's own inventory of goods
and the goods being consigned are of the same type, then the consignor must give the prior
inventory secured parties direct written notification of its interest in order to have priority
over the earlier secured parties. U.C.C. § 9-114 (1991). This provision parallels the provi-
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True consignments, although indirectly brought into Article 9 in
this fashion, are not necessarily equated with Article 9 secured trans-
actions. The true consignor's interest is not denominated a security
interest as such.66 True consignments are often used when the con-
signor desires to fix the price at which the consignee sells the goods67
or when the consignee does not want to bear the risk of the market by
buying the goods from the consignor.68 By requiring an Article 9 fil-
ing or similar act of public notification, the drafters simply recognized
that consignments, whether true or security in nature, present
problems of ostensible ownership. The consignee's possession of the
goods may deceive third parties into believing that the consignee owns
the goods free and clear of all other claims.69
In a true consignment, the consignor remains the titleholder, and
the consignee holds a more limited interest. That interest includes the
right to retain the goods until they are sold or until the consignee de-
cides to return them unsold to the consignor.70 A true consignment
seems therefore to be more like a traditional bailment, with the con-
signee possessing the goods for a restricted purpose and for a limited
period of time. To the extent that a bailee has sufficient rights to sup-
port the attachment of a security interest, the consignee in a true con-
signment arguably has such rights as well.71
sion requiring purchase money inventory secured parties claiming a superpriority to have
given written notification to earlier inventory secured parties. Id. § 9-312(3).
66. Only where the consignment is intended for security purposes is the consignor's
reservation of title denominated a "security interest." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1991).
67. See, e.g., Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 175 N.W.2d 465,471 (Wis. 1970) (noting
that the presence of a price-fixing element in a consignment arrangement made it a "true"
consignment). Professor Hawkland has been the chief promoter of the view that the only
true consignments are those that involve price fixing. See William D. Hawkland, Consign-
ment Selling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 146, 148-49 (1962); Hawk-
land, supra note 65, at 109-10; William D. Hawkland, Consignments Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Sales or Security?, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CO-ORDINATOR AN.
NOTATED 395 (1963).
68. The consignee's right to return unsold goods spares it from bearing the risk of the
market because presumably it is not obligated to pay for the goods returned. See 1 GIL-
MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 24, § 11.2, at 338.
69. See ROBERT M. LLOYD, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 12.02 (1988); Peter Winship,
The "True" Consignment Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Related Peccadilloes,
29 Sw. LJ. 825, 844-45 (1975).
70. Normally, the consignment agreement will specify that title to the consigned goods
remains with the consignor until the goods are sold to a purchaser, at which time title
passes directly from the consignor to the purchaser. See, e.g., Mann v. Clark Oil & Ref.
Co., 302 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (E.D. Mo. 1969), affd, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
71. See, e.g., Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 229 S.E.2d 278, 283 (N.C. 1976) (affirming
summary judgment that debtor has sufficient rights in consigned goods for attachment of a
security interest); Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 249 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969)
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Section 2-326 itself hints at an answer to the question of whether
security interests given by the consignee can attach to consigned
goods. Goods held on sale or return are subject to the claims of the
buyer's creditors while in the buyer's possession.72 Goods delivered
to a consignee as part of certain true consignments73 are deemed to be
held on sale or return unless the consignor complies with one of the
three notification options.74 Thus, by negative implication, the con-
signor who complies with the notification provision can rest upon its
title to remove the goods from the reach of all creditors, including
secured creditors. The question of attachment is irrelevant in that in-
stance. Even if the security interest attaches to the goods, the con-
signor's title preempts the security interest.7'
Conversely, if the consignor does not comply with one of the no-
tification options, the goods are subject to the claims of the con-
signee's creditors.76 Arguably, the consignee's "creditors" include its
secured creditors, which would imply that the consignee has sufficient
rights in the consigned goods for Article 9 security interests to at-
tach.77 Section 9-114 confirms this analysis by specifically subordinat-
ing a nonfiling consignor to a secured party with a security interest in
the consignee/debtor's inventory.78 Thus, the drafters of Article 9
(holding that debtor-consignee has sufficient rights in consigned goods for a security inter-
est to attach).
72. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1991).
73. Section 2-326 refers to situations in which "goods are delivered to a person for sale
and such person maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind in-
volved, under a name other than the name of the person making the delivery." Id. at (3).
True consignments in which the consignee takes possession of the consigned goods for the
purpose of arranging their sale to a third party generally fit this description.
74. Id; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. In this instance, the secured party would be accorded a ranking junior even to the
consignor. The consignor's title or ownership interest in the goods will completely swallow
up all other interests. The true consignment differs from the situation in which the debtor
has given security interests to two secured parties. In the latter situation, even if the senior
secured party satisfies its interest in full first, the remaining value of the collateral may be
sufficient to satisfy at least a portion of the junior secured party's interest. In a true con-
signment, the consignee has no indebtedness to the consignor until the goods are sold. The
consignor's interest is not in having a particular amount of debt satisfied, but in having the
goods returned or their sale price remitted. It is therefore unlikely that there would be any
surplus value to give to a secured party even if its security interest had attached to the
consigned goods.
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. But see Cantor v. Anderson, 639 F. Supp. 364,368 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that debtor-
consignee did not have sufficient rights in consigned painting for attachment of security
interest), affd, 833 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1986).
78. Section 9-114 treats true consignments similarly to purchase money security inter-
ests in inventory by requiring the consignor desiring priority both to file a financing state-
ment and to notify prior filed inventory secured parties in writing of the consignor's
interest in particular goods. Compare U.C.C. § 9-114 (1991) (requiring consignors claiming
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must have assumed that the consignee in a true consignment would
have sufficient rights in the consigned goods for inventory security in-
terests to attach.79
2. Other Bailments
The drafters clearly thought more about consignments than they
did about other types of bailments, and apparently desired to push
almost all consignments into Article 9 for the purposes of filing and, to
a lesser extent, determining priorities. Although the question of at-
tachment does not appear to have been of paramount importance, the
drafters seemingly assumed that security interests could attach to con-
signed goods, whether those goods were held on a true or a security
consignment.80 In a true consignment, however, the consignee's rights
in the goods are minimal-the right of possession coupled with the
ability to sell the goods on behalf of the consignor.81 If those rights
satisfy the standard for rights in the collateral, then the bailee's inter-
est in other types of bailments involving possession for some limited
purpose arguably also satisfies it.
Bailments not constituting leases or consignments comprise sev-
eral disparate types of transactions. They all involve the bailor's relin-
quishment of the goods to the bailee for a limited duration and for a
specific purpose. These purposes include processing raw materials
into a finished product,'m breeding and maintaining livestock, 83 repair-
ing defective goods,' and storing or transporting goods.85
priority to file a financing statement and notify prior inventory secured parties) with
U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (requiring purchase money-secured parties claiming priority to notify
prior inventory secured parties).
79. For an excellent discussion of this issue and others relating to consignments, see
Hillinger, supra note 62.
80. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 62.
82. Medomak Canning Co. v. William Underwood Co. (In re Medomak Canning Co.),
25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437, 440-41 (Bankr. D. Me. 1977); Litwiller Mach. &
Mfg., Inc. v. NBD Alpena Bank, 457 N.W.2d 163, 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam);
State Bank of Young America v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn.
1980); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210, 211 (Okla. 1977).
83. See Germany v. Farmer's Home Admin. (In re Germany), 73 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr.
S.D. Miss. 1986); Union State Bank v. Cook (In re Cook), 63 B.R. 789, 791-92 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1986).
84. See Rameker v. Federal R.R. Admin. (In re Chicago, Madison & Northern Ry.),
36 B.R. 292, 293-94 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1984).
85. See In re Farmers Grain Exch., Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1054, 1056
(W.D. Wis. 1976); Petzoldt v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 157 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (D. Colo.
1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1958).
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Courts have disagreed about whether a debtor who takes posses-
sion of goods from the owner for the purpose of processing them into
some other form acquires sufficient rights for a security interest to
attach. The resolution of the issue seems to turn on whether the court
classifies the arrangement between the owner and the debtor as a bail-
ment or a sale. Two cases involving the same debtor illustrate this
point.
In Eastman Kodak Company v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting
and Refining, Inc.) (Sitkin 4,86 Kodak, a manufacturer of photo-
graphic film, delivered film waste to Sitkin so that Sitkin could recover
the silver content from the waste. 7 Under the contract Sitkin was
required to purchase any silver so recovered.8 At the time of Sitkin's
bankruptcy, it had in its possession 382,000 pounds of Kodak film
waste.8 9 Despite several features of the arrangement that suggested a
sale of future goods, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
transaction between Kodak and Sitkin constituted a bailment.90 The
court emphasized that Kodak had special reasons for not wanting to
sell the film waste to Sitkin outright.91
In addition, the contract between the two parties suggested that
they did not intend a sale to Sitkin until the silver had been extracted
from the waste.92 For example, Kodak had the right to demand return
of the film waste at any time before the silver was extracted.93 The
film also retained its Kodak labels and was stored in separate ware-
houses apart from other material processed by Sitkin.94 Only after
the film had been processed and the silver extracted was Sitkin obli-
gated to purchase the metal recovered on processing. 95
The Fifth Circuit panel held that Sitkin's rights in the film waste
as a bailee were insufficient for the competing security interest to at-
86. 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1214.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1216-17.
91. The film sent to Sitkin for processing was of inferior quality, and thus Kodak was
concerned that, while intact, it should not fall into the hands of anyone who might attempt
to sell it as Kodak film and thereby undermine Kodak's reputation for quality. Id. at 1214.
In addition, Kodak was involved in litigation with Polaroid, for whom Sitkin also processed
film, and it was imperative that the film not inadvertently fall into Polaroid's hands. Id.
92. Id.
93. Upon two days' notice, either party could cancel the contract and at that point the
film waste in Sitkin's possession, at Kodak's option, would be either returned to Kodak or
processed. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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tach.96 In addition, the court found nothing in the Code that allowed
the secured party to acquire any better rights than the ones enjoyed
by the debtor.97 Section 2-403(1), allowing certain purchasers with
voidable title to pass good title to good faith purchasers for value, did
not apply because the debtor was not a purchaser with a voidable title;
it did not have any title at all.98 Section 2-403(2), which applies explic-
itly to bailment situations, did not help the secured party either be-
cause it protects only buyers in the ordinary course of business.99 The
Code's definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" specifi-
cally excludes secured parties.1°° Thus, the secured party in Sitkin I
could not boost its position beyond that of the debtor.
In a case decided a few months later involving the same bankrupt
debtor, the Fifth Circuit panel found in favor of the inventory secured
party and against the putative bailor. In WESGO Division of GTE
Products Corp. v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc.)
(Sitkin 11),101 the plaintiff WESGO supplied scrap metal to Sitkin for
processing. Under the contract, WESGO could elect that Sitkin
purchase the precious metals recovered during processing or return
metals of like kind and quality minus a processing fee.1°2 Upon
Sitkin's insolvency WESGO sought to reclaim thirty-five drums of un-
processed scrap material in Sitkin's possession.10 3 As in Sitkin I, the
supplier argued that Sitkin held the goods as a mere bailee and thus
WESGO, as the true owner, had the right to retake the goods based
on its title.104 The good faith purchaser doctrine of section 2-403(1),
the supplier asserted, did not apply to give the inventory secured party
good title.10 5
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1215-16.
98. Id. at 1215; cf. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that where the bankrupt was a purchaser from the claimant,
the secured creditor can be a "good faith purchaser" and take good title under § 2403(1))
cert denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
99. Sitkin I, 639 F.2d at 1215-16.
100. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1991) ("'Buying' may be for cash or by exchange of other prop-
erty or on secured or unsecured credit.., but does not include a transfer in bulk or as
security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.").
101. 648 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 253.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 254.
105. The good faith purchaser doctrine of § 2403(1) applies only when the transferor
has at least voidable title. In that circumstance the transferor can transfer good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1991). A simple bailee of goods argua-
bly has no title in them whatsoever. Sitkin II, 648 F.2d at 254.
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Contrary to Sitkin I, the court held that the transaction between
WESGO and Sitkin was a sale of goods and not merely a bailment.10 6
Sitkin in essence agreed to purchase the scrap material either for cash
or by return of precious metals."° In contrast to Kodak's arrange-
ment with Sitkin in Sitkin I, WESGO did not have the option to de-
mand return of the scrap material once it was delivered to Sitkin for
processing. 08 Nor did Sitkin have the option to cancel the contract
and return the scrap, as it did in its arrangement with Kodak.10 9 The
court also noted that the unique features of the Kodak-Sitkin contract
made it clear that "the parties intended that title remain in Kodak
until the scrap material had been processed.""'
Because the court found that the transaction between Sitkin and
WESGO constituted a sale, it held that Sitkin's "voidable" title gave it
the ability to pass good title to a good faith purchaser such as the
inventory secured party."' The inventory secured party was thus enti-
tled to prevail against the interest of WESGO as an unpaid seller." 2
The opinions in these two cases illustrate some of the difficulties
that courts have had in distinguishing between bailments and sales
and between rights sufficient for attachment and rights that are not.
For one thing, the distinction between the bailment in Sitkin I and the
sale in Sitkin 11 turns mainly on facts not apparent to anyone but the
parties to the transaction. Kodak's option to cancel the contract and
its reasons for desiring to retain title would not be apparent to even a
diligent inquiring creditor. If Sitkin's business is processing waste
materials received from various suppliers, whom Sitkin is obligated to
pay in some fashion, then perhaps it is asking too much to expect third
parties to investigate the precise terms of every agreement that Sitkin
has with its suppliers.
The Code's drafters recognized the unfair burden placed on third
parties to discover the debtor's arrangement with individual suppliers
in its treatment of consignments." 3 A debtor holding inventory for
sale may possess inventory purchased from suppliers as well as inven-
tory held on consignment from suppliers. Regardless of the manner in
106. The court stated that "[tihe agreement was essentially a contract for the sale of
future goods." Sitkin II, 648 F.2d at 254.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. In Sitkin I, Kodak had particular reasons for not wanting to sell the scrap film
to Sitkin outright. See supra note 91.
111. Sitkin HI, 648 F.2d at 255.
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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which the debtor holds the inventory, the supplier who desires to
claim an interest in the property must cure the ostensible ownership
problem in some fashion. The supplier who has sold goods to the
debtor while reserving a security interest must file a financing state-
ment under Article 9 to perfect its interest." 4 The supplier who has
consigned goods to the debtor in most cases will similarly be required
to file an Article 9 financing statement." 5
In either sale or consignment situations, the inquiring creditor
can refer to the public record as the means of ascertaining prior inter-
ests. The creditor dealing with the debtor's inventory in these circum-
stances does not have to inquire into the details of arrangements
between the debtor and its suppliers. The Sitkin cases illustrate that
third-party creditors must investigate the debtor's arrangements to de-
termine whether goods in debtor's possession are held on a bailment
or owned outright. Such investigation may not be burdensome if the
debtor's principal business is processing or repairing goods that are
then returned to the bailor-e.g., a shoe repair shop normally does
not purchase the shoes that it repairs; a film development store does
not ordinarily purchase the exposed film that it processes into prints
or slides. However in the Sitkin cases, the debtor's arrangements with
its suppliers were not so clear-cut. The debtor, after extracting the
precious metals from the waste products delivered to it, sometimes
paid the supplier for the metals and sometimes returned the metals
minus a processing fee." 6 In the former situation the debtor ulti-
mately bought the goods from the supplier; in the latter the debtor
provided the supplier with a service. In some instances, the supplier
apparently had the option to choose between the sale or service
option." 7
The courts deciding the Sitkin cases and others involving bail-
ments and quasi-bailments sometimes bypass Article 9 analysis and
instead focus unnecessarily on the good faith purchaser doctrine in
section 2-403. By emphasizing the good faith purchaser doctrine,
courts have portrayed the basic conflict in these cases as between an
"owner" of the collateral and a "purchaser" of the collateral. In many
of these cases the true nature of the conflict is between two secured
parties. The true owner's reservation of title is in reality the reserva-
tion of a security interest only. If one looks behind the form of the
114. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1991).
115. See supra note 64.
116. See Sitkin I, 639 F.2d at 1214; Sitkin 11, 648 F.2d at 253.
117. Sitkin II, 648 F.2d at 253.
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transaction to its real purpose and substance, the security aspects be-
come evident.
A "bailment" that functions as a financing device frequently oc-
curs in industries where the bailor supplies raw materials to the bailee
for manufacture into some finished product.1 ' In the typical secured
transaction, the lender provides a loan to the debtor that enables it to
acquire inventory for processing or immediate sale. The lender ob-
tains a security interest in the inventory to secure the debtor's repay-
ment of the loan. In some industries a business sells particular goods
that another business has manufactured according to the seller's speci-
fications. Instead of furnishing working capital to the manufacturer,
the seller supplies the necessary raw materials to the manufacturer.
Upon completion of the goods, the manufacturer then sells them on
the seller/supplier's behalf or returns them to the supplier minus a
fee."19
When the supplier retains title to the raw materials supplied in
these situations, it does so as a security device. If the manufacturer
fails to deliver the finished product or fails to remit proceeds of fin-
ished goods sold to buyers on the supplier's behalf, then the supplier
may attempt to repossess the raw materials and any finished or unfin-
ished goods to satisfy the manufacturer's obligation.
In sales transactions, the Uniform Commercial Code treats the
seller's reservation of title as merely the reservation of a security in-
terest. 20 Case law holds that in consignments intended for security,
the consignor's reservation of title is in effect the reservation of a se-
curity interest. The question remains whether title retention in a bail-
ment should be treated as equivalent to the creation of a security
interest.
Article 9 applies generally to transactions in which the parties in-
tend to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures;' 21
"security interest" is defined generally as "an interest in personal
118. See generally Brent Gordon Summers, Note, "Bailment for Processing". Article
Nine Security Interest or Title Retention Contract?, 61 OR. L. REv. 441 (1982) (arguing that
the supply of raw materials to a manufacturer is in essence a financing device).
119. See Kinetics Technology Int'l Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 705 F.2d 396, 397 (10th
Cir. 1983) (noting that supplier furnished tubes, castings, and other materials to debtor for
manufacture into furnace economizers); Medomak Canning Co. v. William Underwood
Co. (In re Medomak Canning Co.), 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437, 439 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1977) (noting that supplier furnished ingredients and packing and shipping materials
for processing into canned pork and beans).
120. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1991) states that "[t]he retention or reservation of title by a
seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer.., is limited in effect to
a reservation of a 'security interest.'
121. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1991).
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property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obli-
gation."122 In the broadest sense of this definition, whenever the
owner of goods releases them to the custody of another for some lim-
ited purpose, the owner's retention of title serves a security purpose.
The owner expects that if the goods are not returned at the appropri-
ate time or if some other obligation with respect to the goods is not
satisfied, then the owner will be able to rely on its title to reclaim the
goods. The owner also expects that its reclamation will be free from
the claims of third parties-that, generally speaking, the bailee does
not have the ability to encumber the property or sell it without the
true owner's consent.
If all transactions in which ownership and possession are in differ-
ent hands are denominated secured transactions covered by Article 9,
then analysis under section 2-403-the good faith purchaser provi-
sion-is' no longer necessary nor desirable. In such circumstances, the
owner must file a financing statement to protect itself from the claims
of third parties. In the absence of a filing or other act of perfection, a
second secured party with a perfected security interest in the debtor's
equipment or inventory will have priority over the unperfected secur-
ity interest of the original owner of the goods. Under this analysis the
courts need not bother with trying to determine whether the second
claimant is a good faith purchaser or buyer in the ordinary course of
business under section 2-403.
The end result of implicating Article 9 whenever ownership and
possession are severed is that true bailments and leases would become
subject to filing requirements, whereas currently they are considered
outside the scope of Article 9's public notification system. In fact,
some scholars have suggested that the inclusion of such transactions
within Article 9 is highly desirable because it lessens the possibility
that third parties will be deceived by the debtor's apparent ownership
of property in its possession."m Of course, the inclusion of all such
transactions within Article 9 carries with it costs that may or may not
be offset by the benefits of increased notification to third parties. 24
For example, an individual who takes her watch to a jewelry store
for repairs expects that the store may possess the watch for a week or
two. To require a filing in that situation would unnecessarily burden
122. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1991).
123. See Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 30, at 189 (arguing
that, as a general rule, holders of nonpossessory property interests should have to cure the
ostensible ownership problem); Kripke, supra note 47, at 800-01 (arguing that true leases
should be subject to Article 9 filing requirements).
124. See Mooney, supra note 47, at 686-87 (arguing that inclusion of true leases within
Article 9 fling requirements is not necessarily cost effective).
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both the watch's owner and the filing system. The owner would be
forced to undertake the expense and effort of filing to protect herself
for a brief period during which ostensible ownership is problematic.
In addition, it is doubtful that third-party creditors of the store would
rely on the store's apparent ownership of a particular used watch. In
many instances the watch's value will be insignificant compared to the
value of the store's total inventory. The fact that the store has a repair
department, moreover, will give third parties some reason to inquire
as to whether the watch is in fact owned by someone else.
The temporary entrustment of a watch to a repair shop contrasts
with the furnishing of raw materials to a manufacturer or processor in
the cases described above. In the latter situation, the value of the
property at stake and the likelihood of third party deception are much
greater. Raw materials being processed into finished goods may con-
stitute a large segment of the manufacturer's inventory at any given
time. In addition, if the manufacturer routinely processes its own
goods as well as those of others, third parties may be misled into
thinking that the raw materials supplied by the supplier are part of the
manufacturer's own inventory.
The relative costs and benefits must also be considered in other
transactions in which possession and ownership are, at least for some
period of time, separated: leases, transactions in which goods are
stored either temporarily or relatively permanently, and situations in
which the debtor is acting as a selling agent for the owner. In each
case, the probability of deception of later creditors must be weighed
against the expense of undertaking a filing.
Leased collateral tends to be equipment rather than inventory.
Article 9 already imposes on inquiring parties interested in the
debtor's equipment for security or other purposes the burden of de-
termining the origin of the debtor's title in the equipment."z For ex-
ample, a filed financing statement remains effective with respect to
collateral transferred to a third party. 26 Hence if C-1 files an appro-
priate financing statement covering a drill press held by its debtor, D,
the financing statement continues to perfect the security interest in
the press once D sells the press to X.127 If C-2 wants to take a security
125. Article 9 states that "any person searching the condition of the ownership of a
debtor must make inquiry as to the debtor's source of title, and must search in the name of
a former owner if circumstances seem to require it." U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 8 (1991).
126. Id. § 9-402(7).
127. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1991) provides that the security interest continues in collateral
upon its sale or disposition unless the "disposition was authorized by the secured party in
the security agreement or otherwise." Thus, if the secured party authorizes the sale of the
drill press to X free of the security interest, then the security interest will be cut off at that
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interest in the press in the hands of X, it must search for financing
statements not only in X's name but also in D's name. Consequently,
in any secured transaction involving used equipment, the later credi-
tor must determine how the debtor acquired the equipment and
whether there might be valid security interests given by a previous
owner.
Other sections of Article 9 impose similar burdens of inquiry on
later creditors.128 Thus, it may not be unreasonable to ask these credi-
tors to determine whether certain items of equipment are leased as
opposed to owned by the debtor. Assuming that the inquiring credi-
tor's standard investigation normally discloses the lessor's interest,
then arguably leases need not be brought under the Article 9 filing
requirements.
The inventory situation is different, however. The Code already
allocates greater monitoring burdens to the inventory financer than to
any other type of secured party. In addition to keeping track of inter-
state movement of the collateral, the creditor with a security interest
in the debtor's inventory must remain abreast of name changes by the
debtor'29 and the location and nature of any proceeds generated from
the sale of the collateral. 3 ° Correspondingly, the burden of investiga-
tion on later creditors is lighter than in situations involving equipment.
For example, a creditor interested in the debtor's inventory need not
be concerned that the debtor purchased the goods from someone who
had given a security interest to an earlier secured party. The second
debtor would be a buyer in the ordinary course of business in most
instances and would take free of any earlier security interests.' 3'
point and the effectiveness of the financing statement is irrelevant. See PERMANENT EDI-
TORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY No. 3, 12 (Mar. 10, 1990) (harmonizing § 9-402(7) and § 9-
306(2)).
128. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (concerning interstate movements of collateral); 9-
402(7) (1991) (regarding effect of name changes).
129. If the debtor changes its name in such a way that the existing financing statement
is rendered seriously misleading, then the secured party must refile in the debtor's new
name to continue perfection in collateral acquired more than four months after the name
change. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1991).
130. The security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds of the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1991). If the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, it
continues to be perfected automatically in any proceeds for ten days after the debtor's
receipt of them. U.C.C. § 9-306(3). Perfection in the proceeds beyond the ten-day period
without any further action by the secured party continues only in certain limited circum-
stances. Id.
131. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1991) allows the buyer in the ordinary course of business to
take free of a security interest created by his seller. "Buyer in the ordinary course of
business" is defined as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale...
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys
in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind." U.C.C.
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This analysis suggests that at least some leases and bailments may
be properly excluded from Article 9 filing requirements. If the bur-
dens of filing exceed the expected benefits to inquiring third parties,
then inclusion of these transactions within the Article 9 scheme will
not be cost effective. As will be explored more fully below, titlehold-
ers in short-term lease and bailment transactions may find filing par-
ticularly burdensome given the quick turnover of the leased or bailed
property. At the same time, in these short-term transactions certain
facts may suggest to third parties that they should not assume that the
debtor owns the property in question-e.g., repair or refurbishment
situations.
B. Consent and Estoppel
Consent and estoppel issues frequently arise in bailment cases.
The bailee, though not the true or sole owner of the collateral, may be
found to have sufficient rights in the collateral for attachment of a
security interest by virtue of the true owner's or co-owner's consent or
misleading behavior.132 These issues could also arise in non-bailment
cases when the true owner or a third party possesses the collateral.
The obligor-debtor need not possess the property sought to be encum-
bered for the true owner to give its consent to the encumbrance or
even to be estopped to deny the obligor's apparent ownership of the
property.13 3
Estoppel, however, will be argued most frequently in cases in
which the obligor-debtor physically possesses the collateral, e.g., by
virtue of a bailment, lease, consignment, sale on approval, or other
arrangement. Estoppel is predicated on the true owner's having mis-
led the secured party by its actions as to the actual state of the obligor-
debtor's rights in the collateral. The lender is more likely to be
deceived, of course, when the debtor possesses the property.
When courts employ estoppel analysis in these cases, they step
outside the strict confines of the Uniform Commercial Code and rely
on general equitable principles. The Code itself permits reference to
general notions of common law and equity unless they are displaced
§ 1-201(9). A debtor purchasing inventory will normally meet this definition because it
will be buying from a manufacturer or wholesaler who deals in goods of the kind involved.
132. See infra notes 135-210 and accompanying text.
133. In In re Pubs, Inc., 618 F.2d 432, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1980), the court found that the
true owner, a corporation, was estopped to deny a security interest given by the obligor-
debtors to the bank in equipment that the corporation, rather than the obligors, possessed.
Id. at 438.
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by specific provisions of the Code."' Because rights in the collateral
is nowhere defined in the Code, it lends itself readily to elaboration by
reference to non-Code concepts such as estoppel.
1. Consent
Article 9 expressly contemplates situations in which the owner of
the collateral and the obligor of the secured debt are not the same
person.135 One assumes that the drafters envisioned transactions in
which the owner of the property gives its consent to the encumbrance
to secure repayment of a loan to the obligor. In this situation both the
owner and the obligor can be considered "debtors" within the mean-
ing of Article 9.136
The owner might assent to another's encumbering its property for
a variety of reasons-compensation, common business purposes, and
familial relationships, among others. In most cases the owner will see
some advantage in the loan to the obligor secured by the owner's
property-for example, when an individual owning two separate but
related incorporated businesses allows the assets of one to be pledged
to secure a loan to the other.137
Sometimes consent cases are relatively straightforward, as when a
parent agrees in writing that a lender may take a security interest in
his car to secure a loan to his child. When the consent issue is not
straightforward, it tends to take one of three forms: (1) Is consent
necessary to give the obligor rights in the collateral? (2) If so, did the
134. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1991) provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including.., the law relative to... estoppel
... shall supplement its provisions."
135. See infra note 136.
136. The term "debtor" under the U.C.C. is defined generally as the obligor of the
secured obligation, "whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-105
(1)(d) (1991). But when the obligor debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the
same person, "the term 'debtor' means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the
Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation,
and may include both where the context so requires." Id. Courts have held that when the
owner and the obligor are not the same person, the owner is a "debtor" for purposes of the
provisions on the security agreements and financing statements. In other words, the
owner, along with the obligor-debtor, must sign the security agreement and the financing
statement. See Baystate Drywall, Inc. v. Chicopee Say. Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1138, 1140-41
(Mass. 1982); Little v. County of Orange, 229 S.E.2d 823, 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); First
Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 393 N.W.2d 458, 460 (S.D. 1986).
137. See, e.g., Advanced Tirbo Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp. (Fla.) (In re Ad-
vanced ilirbo Prods., Inc.), 126 B.R. 630,631 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that president
of owner of equipment was also debtor corporation's president); Peterson v. First Tenn.
Bank, slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ten file) (same),
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party permitting the encumbrance have authority to do so? and (3)
Was the consent sufficiently manifested orally or in writing?
The necessity of obtaining consent depends on whether the
debtor has rights in the collateral without the consent of the third
party. 38 In other words, in the familiar bailment cases, if the debtor's
possession of goods and the authority to transform them into a fin-
ished product are sufficient to give her rights in the collateral, then the
bailor's consent to the security interest will not be necessary to ensure
attachment.
In many cases, however, the debtor will not have even the mini-
mal rights afforded a bailee or his rights will be restricted in some
way. 139 For example, a corporation normally does not have any inter-
est in the individual property of its officers and directors, but some-
times an officer will agree to pledge her individual assets to secure a
loan to the corporation."4 Similarly, a partner, although having a
property interest in the partnership assets, may be prevented by the
138. When U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1991) refers to the "debtor" having rights in the col-
lateral, the word "debtor" could mean either the obligor or the owner of the collateral
when they are not the same person. Section 9-105(1)(d), which delines "debtor," indicates
that the word "means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing
with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation and may include
both where the context so requires." Arguably, § 9-203(1)(c) concerns the collateral, and
thus the debtor who has rights in the collateral must be the owner-debtor rather than the
obligor-debtor. But it is somewhat redundant to say that the "ovner" debtor must have
rights in the collateral-the term "owner" implies that one has title to the property in
question. Perhaps by "owner" the drafters meant the party who has rights in the collateral.
In other words, in a secured transaction there could be two debtors-one who owes the
obligation to the secured party and the other who furnishes the collateral and has some
rights in it sufficient to support attachment, whether or not those rights amount to full title.
If this interpretation is correct, then the obligor does not need to gain rights in the collat-
eral through the owner's consent. It is merely implicit that the obligor needs the owner's
permission to pledge the latter's property as security for a loan.
Some courts have treated the owner's consent, however, as giving the obligor-debtor
the necessary rights in the collateral. See, eg., K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc.,
128 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wash-
ington Trust Co., 386 A.2d 1096, 1098 (R.I. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 393 N.W.2d
458, 460 (S.D. 1986).
139. The Official Comment to § 9-112 states that that section does not purport to deter-
mine when an obligor debtor may encumber another's property or whether an owner-
debtor may mortgage his own property to secure another's debt. 'These questions are pre-
sumably left to non-Code law. U.C.C. § 9-112 cmt. (1991).
140. See United States Small Business Admin. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Whatley), 874 F.2d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1989); Northeast Nat'l Bank v. Tillotson, 12 B.R. 124,
125 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981); Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 286 N.Y.S.2d
390, 392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
partnership agreement from using partnership property as security for
an individual debt without the consent of all partners. 41
Sometimes a debtor who clearly has rights in the collateral will be
restrained by his agreement with a third party from encumbering the
property without the third party's consent. Courts often find these
anti-assignment clauses valid; for example, in a franchise agreement
the franchisor may prohibit a franchisee who owns various pieces of
equipment and fixtures from assigning an interest in them to a credi-
tor.142 On the other hand, Article 9 explicitly prohibits an account
debtor from requiring that the debtor obtain its consent before as-
signing an account or encumbering a general intangible on which the
account debtor is obligated. 43
If consent is necessary to attachment of the security interest, con-
sent must be properly given. Hence the person giving consent must
have authority to do so, and the consent must be sufficiently mani-
fested. Ideally, the person giving consent should be either the true
owner or an agent with actual authority to encumber the property.
For example, a corporate officer acting pursuant to the corporate
charter or a corporate resolution would have authority to give a secur-
ity interest in corporate assets. 44 Similarly, a partner, depending on
the partnership agreement, could be authorized to encumber partner-
ship assets on behalf of the partnership. 45
Apparent authority and ratification cases are more difficult, how-
ever. In both instances the agent does not have actual authority to
bind the true owner, but it has apparent authority to do so' 46 or the
true owner ratifies the agent's actions after the fact.147 For example, a
141. See Grant v. Podes (In re O'Connell), 119 B.R. 311, 312 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
On the other hand, a partner may validly assign his share of benefits to be received from
the sale of a partnership asset without the consent of the other partners. See Wellsville
Bank v. Nicolay, 638 P.2d 975, 977 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
142. Capital Nat'l Bank v. McDonald's Corp., 625 F. Supp. 874, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
143. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1991); see Knecht Bros. v. Ames Constr., 404 N.W.2d 859, 861
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
144. New Commonwealth Publishing Co. v. Baybank Middlesex (In re New Common-
wealth Publishing Co.), 118 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); Mid City Bank, Inc. v.
Omaha Butcher Supply, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Neb. 1986).
145. Actual authority to bind the partnership may be derived from a statute, "from
express provisions of the partnership agreement, from the directions of the other partners,
or as an incident to other actual authority." Bates County Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 767
S.W.2d 101, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
146. See Hill v. Van Sandt, 40 P. 676, 678 (Kan. Ct. App. 1895); First Nat'l Bank v.
Kissare, 98 P.2d 433, 434 (Okla. 1908); Fuller & Co. v. Longmire, 166 P.2d 623, 624 (Wash.
1917).
147. See K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 345,348 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976); Bates County Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 767 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
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partner might show the secured party a superseded resolution of the
partnership authorizing her to grant a security interest in partnership
property. If the secured party was not negligent in not further verify-
ing the partner's status, then arguably the partner would have appar-
ent authority to encumber partnership property. Similarly, if the
partnership accepted the benefits of a loan from the secured party
with the awareness that a partner had purported to give a security
interest in partnership property, then a court may find that the part-
nership ratified the partner's actions even though he acted without
actual or apparent authority."4
Apparent authority and ratification may be viewed as embraced
within the broader concept of estoppel, which will be discussed more
fully below. In all three cases the true owner of the collateral misleads
the secured party by its words or actions or both. The secured party
justifiably relies on apparent consent, after-the-fact acceptance of ben-
efits, or seeming ownership by the debtor in making the initial loan or
continuing to advance funds under a line of credit. The existence of
apparent authority, ratification, and estoppel depends on the nature of
the true owner's conduct, any negligence on its part, the reasonable-
ness of the secured party's reliance, and the detriment to the secured
party.
If the true owner's consent to the encumbrance is the basis for
the obligor-debtor's asserting its rights in the collateral, there remains
the question of whether the consent must be manifested in writing.
This issue raises the same policy concerns as the Statute of Frauds. In
some cases the true owner of the collateral may argue that she never
consented to the encumbrance. Requiring a writing provides concrete
evidence of the parties' intent and reduces the issues for litigation.
Even in cases in which the true owner admits his consent to the en-
cumbrance, insistence on a writing guards against possible after-the-
fact collusion among the owner, the debtor, and the secured party.
For example, if the true owner has also personally guaranteed the
debtor's obligation, she might prefer to admit to a security interest in
certain of her business assets rather than be liable on the personal
guarantee.
Both written security agreements and financing statements must
be signed by the "debtor."' 49 When the obligor-debtor and the owner
Mauch v. First Natl Bank, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 831, 832 (Okla. 1967) (per
curiam).
148. See New Commonwealth Publishing Co., 118 B.R. at 160.
149. U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a) (pertaining to security agreement), 9-402(1) (describing re-
quirements of valid financing statement) (1991).
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debtor are not the same person, courts have required that these docu-
ments be signed by both debtors15 and that the financing statement
be filed in both names. Requiring both signatures on these documents
ensures that both the owner and the obligor consent to the granting of
the security interest. Theoretically, if the obligor signed the promis-
sory note and the owner signed the security agreement, one could per-
haps dispense with the obligor's signature on the security
agreement.15 1 But the security agreement usually contains matters
pertaining to the obligation and the maintenance of the collateral that
will directly affect the obligor, particularly if he has possession of the
collateral.152
The owner's signature on the financing statement guarantees that
the owner agrees to the description of collateral contained in that doc-
ument. 53 The description on the financing statement does not define
the scope of the security interest unless the security agreement also
serves as the financing statement. 54 Nonetheless, the owner might
not want an overly broad description in the public records clouding its
ability to obtain credit. 55
Finally, courts have generally required that the financing state-
ment show the names of both the obligor and the owner and be in-
150. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank North v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Mayo),
112 B.R. 607, 648 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (applying rule to financing statement); K.N.C.
Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Motz v.
Central Nat'l Bank, 456 N.E.2d 958, 963 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (applying rule to security
agreements); Baystate Drywall, Inc. v. Chicopee Say. Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1138, 1140.41
(Mass. 1982) (applying rule to security agreements); First Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 393
N.W.2d 458, 460 (S.D. 1986) (applying rule to financing statements by implication).
151. See Little v. County of Orange, 229 S.E.2d 823,825 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (implying
that only owner debtor's signature is required on the security agreement).
152. A typical security agreement has clauses requiring the debtor to maintain insur-
ance on the collateral, to keep it in good repair, and not to move it from the debtor's
premises without the secured party's permission. It will also contain a definition of default
and other matters relating to the obligation. All of these terms will be relevant to the
obligor. See DUNCAN Er AL, supra note 24, at A-1 to A-5.
153. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 1032.
154. A security agreement may also serve as a financing statement if it contains the
requisite information: the names and addresses of the debtor and the secured party, the
debtor's signature, and a listing of the types of, or a description of the items of, collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1991).
155. If the senior secured party files a security interest covering a broad category of
property (e.g., "equipment"), then that party is ensured top priority in all items of property
within that category even if security agreements regarding those items are not executed
until a later date. Thus subsequent would-be lenders to the debtor will be reluctant to lend
against any items in that category without a subordination agreement from the senior se-
cured party. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1991); REILEY, supra note 24, § 3.09[2].
[Vol. 73
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
dexed in both names.'56 In this way, creditors of both debtors will be
put on notice that the property described may be encumbered. Noti-
fying the owner's creditors is particularly important if the owner re-
tains possession of the collateral; otherwise, her creditors would have
no other ready way of discovering the security interest given to secure
an obligation undertaken by a wholly different debtor.
Recent cases have not addressed whether an owner could orally
assent to the use of his property as collateral for a loan to the obligor.
Some pre-U.C.C. cases suggest that oral consent, if sufficiently
proved, would be adequate. 57 Because Article 9, however, requires
that the security agreement be signed by the debtor, and debtor in this
context means both the owner of the collateral and the obligor, it fol-
lows that oral consent will probably not be sufficient.
Although oral consent will not substitute for the owner's signa-
ture on the security agreement, some courts have applied the doctrine
of estoppel to find that the true owner was estopped from denying the
security interest's existence. In these cases the courts recognize that
the true owner's actions, although not complying with the formal req-
uisites for creating a security interest under Article 9, can mislead the
secured party, and thus they force the owner of the collateral to take
subject to the security interest.
2. Estoppel
The concept of equitable estoppel has been used to create rights
in the collateral for purposes of attachment of security interests under
section 9-203(1)(c). This concept most often operates to enlarge upon
some slender rights that the debtor actually enjoyed in the property.
Through this enlargement the debtor acquires sufficient rights for at-
tachment of a security interest.
In most cases the true owner will have granted some rights to the
debtor. Rarely will the debtor start with literally nothing and subse-
quently obtain rights through the application of estoppel. It is difficult
to apply estoppel to the true owner when the true owner has not
vested the debtor with possession or control over the collateral. Most
often the true owner will have given the debtor possession of the col-
lateral, frequently with some right to use or control the property.
156. K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 393 N.W.2d 458, 460 (S.D. 1986).
157. See Parsons v. Kimmel, 173 N.W. 539,540 (Mich. 1919); Mauch v. First Nat'l Bank,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 831 (Okla. 1967) (citing U.C.C. § 9-112, but relying on
pre-Code analysis).
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The application of estoppel in these cases is derived from two
sources: the Code itself and common law. Section 2-403 of the Code
recognizes that sometimes an individual can transfer more rights than
she actually has to certain transferees. For example, under section 2-
403(1) a "person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value."'58 In other words, if X sells a
drill press to A and A pays for it by check, title to the press will pass
to A upon delivery.' 59 Presumably, this title is subject to defeasance if
A's check is returned for insufficient funds.' 60 Nonetheless, A can
pass good title to the press to a bona fide purchaser for value.' 6 1 X,
the original owner of the press, is estopped from asserting its rights to
reclaim the property in the hands of the bona fide purchaser. 6
The notion of estoppel extends further in subsection 2 of section
2-403, which creates the entrustment doctrine. If the true owner of
goods entrusts possession of them to a merchant who deals in goods of
that kind, the merchant may then transfer all of the owner's rights in
the goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 163 Thus if the
true owner had full title to the goods, the merchant's buyer also ac-
quires full title, even without the true owner's consent. 64
Both the voidable title doctrine and the entrustment doctrine in-
volve concepts of estoppel in the sense that the transferee's rights are
enlarged when it relies to its detriment on the original owner's con-
duct. In the cases involving voidable title, the transferor will normally
have both title and possession of the goods ultimately sold to the good
faith purchaser. The good faith purchaser, by definition, will have re-
lied on this title and possession to form the belief that the transferor
158. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1991).
159. WnrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 173.
160. The U.C.C. nowhere defines "voidable title"; at least one court has noted that
"once there is delivery of possession of goods from a seller to a buyer, with the intent that
the buyer become the owner of the goods, the buyer obtains voidable title." Ledbetter v.
Darwin Dobbs Co., 473 So. 2d 197,200 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1985). One may speculate that
the concept refers also to the seller's right to stop delivery of goods in transit or to reclaim
goods already delivered when it discovers that the buyer is insolvent. See U.C.C. §§ 2-702,
2-705(1) (1991).
161. See Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1361 (5th Cir.),
modified, 715 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1983); Georgia Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Tenneville Banking
Co. (In re Smith), 51 B.R. 904, 909 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985); Dick Hatfield Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Bob Watson Motors, Inc., 708 P.2d 494, 496-97 (Kan. 1985).
162. See Ledbetter, 473 So. 2d at 202; Jordan v. Butler, 156 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Neb.
1968); Cox v. Gerald Modell, Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1200, 1202 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976).
163. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1991); see WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 175-78.
164. See Simson v. Moon, 222 S.E.2d 873, 874-75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Western Crane & Rigging Co., 166 N.W.2d 409,411 (Neb. 1969); American
Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 316 S.E.2d 186, 194 (N.C. 1984).
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owns the goods free and clear. For example, if the transferor presents
a bill of sale reflecting a completed transaction with the original
owner, then presumably the good faith purchaser will have no reason
to question the state of the transferor's title, barring any irregularities
in their dealings.
In cases involving the entrustment doctrine, the merchant seller
will have possession of goods but no title.'65 The true owner of the
goods has entrusted them to the merchant for the purpose of storing
them, repairing them, or perhaps selling them to a third party. Even
though completely lacking title, the merchant can pass good title to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business because the statute essen-
tially estops the true owner from asserting his title. The true owner's
according the merchant the appearance of ownership creates the
estoppel.
These two statutorily verified uses of estoppel do not apply, how-
ever, to all cases in which third parties may be deceived by another's
possession and use of property. A creditor with an Article 9 security
interest does not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.166 Therefore, the entrustment doctrine will not affect the status
of the secured party of the merchant bailee vis-A-vis the true owner of
the goods. Similarly, the voidable title doctrine will not advance the
position of a secured party whose debtor did not acquire any title,
voidable or otherwise, from the original owner.
In several cases secured parties have argued that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, operated to prevent the true
owner of collateral from asserting her title to reclaim the goods as
against the secured party. Traditionally, the party asserting equitable
estoppel must show that six elements are satisfied: that the party to
be estopped (1) engaged in conduct amounting to a false representa-
tion or concealment of material facts, (2) had the intention or expecta-
tion that such conduct would be acted upon by the other party, and
(3) had knowledge of the actual facts; and that the party claiming the
estoppel (4) lacked knowledge and the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question, (5) relied in good faith upon the con-
165. U.C.C. § 2-403(3) (1991) ("'Ehtrusting' includes any delivery and any acquies-
cence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties
to the delivery or acquiescence.. . ."); see WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 175-76
(describing various entrustment situations).
166. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1991); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jim Payne Pontiac GMC,
Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 768, 773 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
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duct or statements of the party to be estopped, and (6) acted or re-
frained from acting so as to prejudicially change his position.167
A review of the cases discussing equitable estoppel reveals that
some of the six elements are emphasized more than the others. The
misrepresentation of a material fact does not have to be fraudulent in
nature. 68 Though some courts refer to the true owner's actions as
demonstrating an intent to deceive the public, 169 most hold that even a
negligently made misrepresentation may estop the true owner.' 70 If,
for example, the true owner of cattle allowed the debtor to brand the
cattle with the debtor's brand, the secured party need not show that
the true owner intended to perpetrate a fraud on the public. Mere
carelessness by the true owner in allowing the debtor to brand the
cattle may suffice for some courts. Thus the "intention" or "expecta-
tion" element often translates into the idea that the true owner should
have been aware that her actions might deceive others.
The most common misrepresentation in these cases involves
clothing the debtor with apparent ownership of the goods. Courts are
sharply divided as to whether simply giving possession to the debtor
sufficiently misrepresents the true state of affairs so as to create an
estoppel. Cases holding that the debtor's possession, without more,
does not create an estoppel place the burden on the secured party to
167. See In re Pubs, Inc., 618 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Jordan Mfg. Co., 138
B.R. 30, 39 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992); In re Atlantic Marble, Inc., 126 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1991); United Jersey Bank v. CS Assocs. (In re CS Assocs.), 121 B.R. 942, 958
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Webb v. First Mutual Corp. Goldome (In re Webb), 99 B.R. 283,
290 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Union State Bank v. Cook (In re Cook), 63 B.R. 789, 798-99
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); First S. Ins. Co. v. Ocean State Bank, 562 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Hill v. Van Sandt, 40 P. 676, 678 (Kan. Ct. App. 1895); Giovane, Ltd. v.
Carlson, No. C5-90-1971, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 285, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 20,
1991); Hawkins v. M & J Fin. Corp., 77 S.E.2d 669, 672 (N.C. 1953); Huntington Nat'l Bank
v. Hartman, No. CA89-06-013, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 365, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5,
1990).
168. The Exchange Nat'l Bank v. AJ. Rackers, Inc. (In re A.J. Rackers, Inc.), 167 B.R.
168, 174 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
169. Hill v. Van Sandt, 40 P. 676,678 (Kan. Ct. App. 1895); O'Connor's Adm'x v. Clark,
32 A. 1029, 1030 (Pa. 1895).
170. Several courts refer to the principle that "as between two innocent parties who
must suffer from the fraud of a third, he who furnished the means to commit the fraud, or
whose negligence enables the third party to commit it, must bear the loss." McDonald v.
Peoples Auto. Loan & Fmo. Corp., 154 S.E.2d 886,890 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); see also Drew v.
Kimball, 43 N.H. 282,286 (1861) (stating that an owner who negligently induces another to
act upon the belief that certain cattle do not actually belong to the owner must bear the
loss of his negligence); First Nat'l Bank v. Kissare, 98 P. 433, 434 (Okla. 1908) (holding that
where one of two parties must suffer from a third party's fraud, the loss should fall upon
the one whose act, negligent or not, created the circumstances that permitted the fraud to
be perpetrated).
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inquire as to the source of the debtor's title to the goods.171 For exam-
ple, in In re Cook'72 the debtors, cattle ranchers, gave a security inter-
est in their cattle, including after-acquired cattle, to the creditor.173
Unbeknownst to the secured party, the debtors cared for their own
cattle and about three dozen head owned by the nonresident brother
of one of the debtors. 7 4 Even though all of the cattle carried the
debtors' brand, the bankruptcy court held that the registration certifi-
cates for the disputed cattle sufficiently established the brother's own-
ership.7 5 The brother, moreover, was not estopped from asserting his
ownership. 76
Arguably, the debtors' custody and care of the cattle, without
more, should not have misled the secured party. The court found that
neither the debtors nor the brother intended to deceive the secured
party about the true state of affairs.'77 In addition, the debtors and
the brother for years had maintained separate records and accounts
for the brother's cattle. 78 There was no evidence that the brother
made an after-the-fact claim of ownership to defeat the security
interest. 79
Finally, the secured party failed to show sufficient reliance on the
debtors' ostensible ownership of the disputed cattle. °80 In ascertaining
the quantity of cattle subject to the security interest, the secured party
had relied on financial statements submitted by the debtors that did
not list any of the brother's cattle. 8 ' The secured party admitted that
171. In re Atlantic Marble, Inc., 126 B.R. 463, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding the
secured party negligent in failing to ascertain how debtor acquired title to collateral).
172. Union State Bank v. Cook (In re Cook), 63 B.R. 789 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986).
173. Id. at 792. The security agreement granted the bank a security interest in all of the
debtors' "livestock now owned or hereafter acquired including the increase thereof but not
limited to the attached list together with the young and produce thereof." Id.
174. Id. at 791.
175. Id. at 795-96. In addition, the brother in all cases purchased the cattle or the an-
cestors of the cattle with his own funds before commingling the cattle with the debtors'
herd. Id.
176. Id. at 798-99.
177. 'lie court noted:
None of the evidence before the court establishes that [the brother] knew of the
Bank's security agreement covering the debtors' cattle .... Nor does the evi-
dence establish that [the brother] intended or expected that his inaction in notify-
ing the Bank of his ownership in the cattle would be acted upon by the Bank or
influence its decisions.
Id. at 799.
178. Id. at 791-93.
179. The evidence established that the brother's "assertion of ownership is more than
an eleventh hour scheme to dispossess a bank of its collateral." Id. at 800.
180. Id. at 799.
181. Id.
1994]
150 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
it had not actually counted the head of cattle at the ranch at any
time.182
The court in In re Cook clearly believed that the secured party
had the burden of inquiring about the debtors' ownership of the cattle
in which it sought to take a security interest. If the creditor had been
reasonably diligent in ascertaining the true state of affairs, it would
have discovered through an examination of the registration certifi-
cates that the debtor's brother owned certain cattle. The creditor
could not rely only on the debtors' possession, control, and branding
of the cattle.18 3 The court's conclusion is perhaps surprising in light of
the presumption under North Dakota law that a "legally registered
brand on livestock shall be prima facie evidence that the animal bear-
ing the same is property of the owner of such brand."'8
Other courts have similarly held that the debtor's possession, by
itself, is not sufficient to estop the true owner from asserting its title to
the goods.185 Often these cases mention facts that should have alerted
the secured party to the debtor's lack of full title to the property. For
example, in Huntington National Bank v. Hartman,"8 6 the debtor gave
a security interest in his farm equipment. The debtor's father in fact
owned some of the equipment on the debtor's farm, and the father
had not given his consent to his son's use of the property as collateral
for a loan. 8 7 When the creditor attempted to enforce the security
interest, the father asserted his ownership of the equipment.' The
court found that the father's actions in allowing his son to use the
equipment did not estop him from reclaiming the goods.'8 9 The father
apparently was unaware that the son had sought to encumber the
equipment and thus was not culpable in deceiving the creditor. 90 The
creditor, moreover, knew that the son's farming business had some
connection with his father's, and the court stated that it was unreason-
182. Id.
183. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Kissare, 98 P. 433 (Okla. 1908) (finding the true owner
of cattle estopped to assert title against bailee's secured party where owner had given
bailee possession and had branded cattle with bailee's brand),
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-09-19 (1980).
185. State Bank of Young Am. v. Wagener, 479 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that possession of hogs by debtors did not give them rights in the hogs where
bailor had clearly reserved all right, title, and interest in the hogs to himself).
186. No. CA89-06-013, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 365 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1990).
187. Id. at *2-3.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id. at *5-6.
190. Id. at *5; see also In re Atlantic Marble, Inc., 126 B.R. 463, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1991) (holding that the true owner of some equipment was not estopped to assert its own-
ership interest against the bailee's secured party when the true owner was unaware that the
bailee had offered the owner's equipment as security for a loan).
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able for the creditor to rely solely on the son's representations as to
ownership.191
In many of the cases in which courts have found that estoppel
created rights in the collateral, the true owner of the collateral seems
to have been well aware that the secured party was laboring under a
misapprehension concerning the ownership. In fact, the owner some-
times contributed directly to the deception. Often the same parties
either owned or controlled the debtor and the owner of the collateral.
The owner's acquiescence to the debtor's use of the property as collat-
eral could thus be inferred.
For example, in In re Pubs, Inc.,192 one of the most often cited
estoppel cases, a bank agreed to make a loan to Hein and Richardson
individually, taking a security interest in their restaurant equip-
ment.193 Before both debtors had signed the security agreement, they
conveyed the equipment to Pubs, Inc., a corporation of which they
were the sole shareholders.194 The bill of sale stated explicitly that the
equipment was being transferred subject to the bank's security inter-
est.' 95 Subsequently, the debtors defaulted on their obligation to the
bank, and the corporation filed a petition in bankruptcy.
96
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that the bank's security interest
did not attach to the restaurant equipment because the individual
debtors, having conveyed the property to the corporation, did not
have any rights in the collateral at the time the security agreement was
executed. 97 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
bankrupt corporation was estopped to deny the validity of the bank's
security interest. 98 Although the corporation, through its owners and
191. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 365, at *5 ("The bank never de-
manded bills of sale or other proof of ownership... [and] the bank never interviewed [the
father] with regard to ownership of the farm and equipment. We believe that the bank had
a greater obligation to investigate the situation before loaning [the son] the money.").
192. 618 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1980).
193. Id. at 435.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Shortly after the security agreement was signed, the bank filed financing state-
ments covering the equipment with the county recorder of deeds and the secretary of state.
Although the bank listed the debtors as Hein and Richardson individually, rather than as
Pubs, Inc., the court found essentially that the bank was entitled to rely upon the debtors'
status at the time that one of the debtors first signed a promissory note. The bank was
unaware that shortly thereafter the debtors transferred the collateral to Pubs, Inc. Id. at
440 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, 1 9-402(7)).
197. Id. at 435-36.
198. The court stated:
Pubs' title to the property was clearly evidenced by the ... bill of sale which
recited that Pubs took the collateral subject the Bank's security interest. Having
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officers, Hein and Richardson, had not affirmatively misled the bank
by declaring the individual debtors to be the owners of the equipment
after its sale to the corporation, it did not correct the bank's misim-
pression that the individual debtors still owned the equipment at the
time the security agreement was signed.199
Obviously, it is somewhat artificial to speak about the individual
debtors and the corporation as if they were operating independently
of each other. The individual debtors and the corporation were essen-
tially alter egos. In that situation the court undoubtedly felt that it
would be grossly unfair to the creditor to allow the individual debtors
to avoid the security interest by making an undisclosed conveyance to
the corporation on the eve of the signing of the security agreement.
The Pubs case stands in sharp contrast to the cases in which es-
toppel was not found. In the latter cases the true owner of the collat-
eral was unaware that the debtor had encumbered its assets and that
the debtor's possession of the owner's property had misled a secured
party. In these cases, it seems, the true owners did not actively or
passively participate in perpetrating a fraud on the secured party.
The level of reliance by the secured party arguably distinguishes
the cases further. In Pubs the bank relied expressly upon the debtors'
representations that they owned the collateral and that they would not
be conveying it to the corporation until a later date. In the cases in
which estoppel was not found, the courts generally held that a secured
creditor is not entitled to rely only upon the debtor's possession of the
collateral as the basis for assuming ownership-the creditor always
has some obligation to investigate the source of the debtor's title to
the property.
Like Pubs, several other cases in which the court found an estop-
pel involve common ownership or control of the debtor and the true
owner of the collateral.2" In Avco Delta Corporation Canada Limited
v. United States,210 for example, a parent corporation owned two sub-
sidiaries, one of which procured a loan from the secured party. The
been put on notice by the recital of the bill of sale, Pubs is estopped to deny the
recited security interest by claiming an interest superior to it.
Id. at 438.
199. Id. at 438-39.
200. See, e.g., Advanced Turbo Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp. (Fla.) (In re Ad-
vanced Tihrbo Prods., Inc.), 126 B.R. 630, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that common
president of debtor and owner of collateral stated that debtor owned collateral); Peterson
v. First Tenn. Bank, slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn
file) (finding that common president of debtor and owner of collateral signed security
agreement creating security interest in collateral).
201. 459 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1972).
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secured party sought to obtain a security interest in twenty-nine pieces
of heavy construction equipment that it believed the debtor-subsidiary
owned.2"2 In fact, the other subsidiary owned the equipment. None-
theless, the court found that the true owner was estopped from assert-
ing its title against the secured creditor because it, along with the
parent corporation, implicitly represented to the creditor that the
debtor subsidiary owned the equipment.20 3 Although the parent and
the owner subsidiary did not expressly state that the debtor owned the
equipment, both provided guarantees of the debtor's obligation to the
secured creditor and were clearly aware that the creditor was relying
on the debtor's asserted ownership of the equipment.2 °4
In innumerable cases not involving secured transactions, estoppel
has been used to prevent the true owner from reclaiming property in
the hands of a third party.2"5 Although these cases do not speak di-
rectly to the question of whether the debtor acquires rights in the col-
lateral for Article 9 purposes, they do, suggest that, in general,
estoppel will be applied when the true owner actively participates in
creating the deception of the public. In other words, although the
mere transfer of possession of property to the debtor is not enough to
estop the owner from asserting its title, additional acts by the owner in
furtherance of the debtor's ostensible ownership will create an estop-
pel. In Drew v. Kimball,20 6 for instance, the plaintiff entrusted his cat-
tle to the debtor so that the latter could sell them on his behalf. The
debtor told plaintiff that the sale could be effected more readily if the
debtor represented to potential buyers that the cattle were his; the
plaintiff agreed to this arrangement.20 7 The debtor then told his credi-
tor, the defendant, that he owned the cattle, and based on this infor-
mation the creditor requested that the sheriff attach the cattle.20 8
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff clearly did not intend for a
creditor of his selling agent to assume that the agent owned the cattle,
the court held that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting his own-
ership interest against the creditor.209 By allowing the debtor to pos-
202. Id. at 438.
203. Id. at 441.
204. The debtor had furnished the secured creditor with corporate resolutions authoriz-
ing the sale of the equipment from the other subsidiary to the debtor and a copy of a bill of
sale reflecting the debtor's title to the equipment. Id. at 440.
205. See, e.g., Preston v. Witherspoon, 9 N.E. 585, 588 (Ind. :1886); American Exch.
Nat'l Bank v. Winder, 150 S.E. 489,491-92 (N.C. 1929); O'Connor's Adm'x v. Clark, 32 A.
1029, 1030 (Pa. 1895).
206. 43 N.H. 282 (1861).
207. Id. at 284.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 288.
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sess the cattle and also to represent to the public generally that he
owned them, the plaintiff assumed the risk that some unintended
party might rely on the debtor's representations to the plaintiff's
detriment.210
3. Equitable Estoppel and Its Relationship to the Code
The consent and estoppel cases lead inevitably to the conclusion
that debtors, in certain circumstances, may grant security interests in
property that they do not "own" or in which they do not have even a
limited property interest, such as a leasehold or license. The express
consent cases are not particularly troublesome because in those cases
the true owner of the collateral, either with or without compensation,
agreed to have the debtor encumber its property. However, in the
estoppel and implied consent situations clearly some owners did not
anticipate or desire that their bailee would grant a security interest in
the property to a third party.21'
Because of the infinite number of permutations of fact patterns in
these cases, it is difficult to predict the outcome in any given case.
Courts vary widely in the degree to which they emphasize one or
more of the six elements traditionally cited as necessary for equitable
estoppel. In fact, the cases assume or ignore some of the six ele-
ments-for instance, they often assume that the party claiming estop-
pel prejudicially changed its position when it took a security interest
(element six) and that the party to be estopped had knowledge of the
"actual" facts (element three), and they frequently ignore the "scien-
ter" element (element two) by holding that a negligent misrepresenta-
tion can serve as the basis for estoppel. The case law's basic division is
between those courts that stress the misrepresentation (element
one)-i.e., the misleading appearance created by the debtor's posses-
sion of certain property and other actions by the true owner-and
those that focus on the secured party's duty to investigate the source
of the debtor's title before taking a security interest-i.e., the secured
party's ability to ascertain the truth (element four) or its justifiable
reliance on the true owner's misrepresentations (element five).
210. Id. According to the court, "the plaintiff put the cattle into [the debtor's] posses-
sion, with the distinct understanding that he should assume to be the owner, and so hold
out to the world." Id.
211. See, e.g., Litwiller Mach. & Mfg., Inc. v. NBD Alpena Bank, 457 N.W.2d 163, 164-
65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); State Bank of Young Am. v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292
N.W.2d 244,249-50 (Minn. 1980); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210,
212-14 (Okla. 1977).
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It is doubtful that the original drafters envisioned the muddy pool
that has collected around this issue over time. It is unclear under what
circumstances the debtor has a sufficient quantum of rights in prop-
erty for attachment to take place. The cases recite in unison that "na-
ked" possession alone is not enough, but it is rare that a debtor has
only possession and nothing more. Arguably, only a thief has posses-
sion and nothing more. Even a body shop doing a one-day repair on a
car has something more than possession-namely, the right to make
certain changes to the vehicle.
By importing the concept of equitable estoppel into these cases,
the courts have attempted to achieve a fair result in situations in
which the true owner has relinquished possession of property to the
debtor for a limited purpose and the secured party conceivably could
have relied on that possession in extending funds to the debtor. But
after-the-fact, ad hoc determinations of this issue do not facilitate
transaction planning by any of the parties involved. The courts' con-
tinued recognition of estoppel, moreover, encourages secured parties
to litigate this issue, even in marginal cases. Finally, the courts' ma-
nipulation of the rights element of attachment has produced a hidden
rule of priority. By holding that the secured party's security interest
has attached, courts often then conclude that the secured party has
priority over another claimant.212 In fact, the other claimant is often
relegated to the status of a general creditor.
212. See WESGO Div. of GTE Prods. Corp. v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting & Ref.,
Inc.), 648 F.2d 252,254-55 (5th Cir. 1981); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Quality Inns, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 1311, 1317-18 (D. Md. 1990); Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359,369 (Ala.
1981); Litwiller Mach. & Mfg., Inc., 457 N.W.2d at 167; Morton Booth Co., 564 P.2d at 214;
cf. State Bank of Young Am., 292 N.W.2d at 250 (holding that secured party had priority
over bailor but only to the extent of bailee's rights in the collateral).
Article 9's default priority rule gives secured parties priority over most other parties
even if the former's interests are unperfected: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchas-
ers of the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1991). Thus, unless some other
Code provision stated a different priority, the drafters clearly wanted to elevate the se-
cured party over most other claimants to the collateral-in particular, the debtor's un-
secured general creditors. Valley Nat'1 Bank v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins., Inc., 747 P.2d
1225, 1230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, § 24-2, at 1126-27.
But it is not clear that "purchasers" and "creditors" were intended to represent the entire
set of third parties who might lay claim to the collateral. For example, a lessor is in some
sense a "creditor" of the lessee, but lessors are allowed to reclaim the leased goods as
against the lessee's secured party despite the absence of a specific Article 9 priority rule to
that effect. The courts assume that the lessor's retention of title is sufficient to give it the
superior claim. See also Donald P. Board, The Scope of Article 9 is Only One Quarter as
Great as is Commonly Supposed, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 951, 1009-12 (1993) (arguing that
§ 9-201 does not provide secured parties with priority over "antecedent transferors," in-
cluding lessors).
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III, OWNERSHIP WITHOUT POSSESSION
A. Leases, Consignments, and Other Bailments
In contrast to the situation in which the debtor has possession of
property that it does not own, sometimes the debtor will have certain
legal rights to property that it does not currently possess. In many
cases the party with ownership but no possession will be involved in a
transaction with a party with possession but no ownership-e.g., the
lessor and lessee, the bailor and bailee, the consignor and consignee.
In all instances the owner will have at least nominal title to the prop-
erty in the hands of the other party. If the owner desires to give a
security interest in the property to a creditor, the issue again arises as
to whether the owner has sufficient rights in the collateral for the se-
curity interest to attach.
Although few cases have spoken to this question, it would seem
that the owner's title to the property constitutes sufficient rights for
attachment of a security interest. Despite Article 2's attempt to
deemphasize the location of title in defining the rights and obligations
of parties to a sales transaction,213 title remains an important concept
in determining ownership in general property law.214
However, the sufficiency of the owner's title as rights in the col-
lateral does not necessarily mean that the owner or the owner's se-
cured party will prevail in a priorities dispute with the debtor's
secured party. In a true lease, the lessor should be able to rely on its
title to retrieve the property from the debtor or the debtor's secured
213. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1991) provides that "[e]ach provision of this Article with regard to
the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third par-
ties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such
title." Karl Llewellyn, the chief architect of Article 2, believed that the concept of title,
with its metaphysical overtones, was completely unhelpful in determining the various rights
and obligations of sellers and buyers in the hurly-burly, practical world of commerce: "[Ti-
tle] remains, in the Sales field, an alien lump, undigested. It even interferes with the diges-
tive process." Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Q.
Rev. 159, 169 (1938).
214. Professor Tabac argues convincingly that despite the Code's avowed deemphasis
on title, the Code itself and subsequent case law in fact often look to title as a basic deter-
minant of ownership rights: "The original Code did not embody the revolution in sales law
that its drafters envisioned. A massive dose of contract was not able to ransom it from
common-law title.... Title principles are still firmly in place, if not in sight, as the frame-
work for today's commerce in goods." William L. Tabac, The Unbearable Lightness of Title
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 MD. L. Rnv. 408, 445 (1991).
Professor Dolan has noted similarly the ingrained psychological attachment to the
concept of title: "[C]ourts and commercial lawyers have resisted-unconsciously, if not
with deliberate stubbornness-the drafters' attempts to deprive them of a concept so cen-
tral to their common law traditions and so responsive to the human longing to be able to
say without condition, 'This is mine and that is yours. " Dolan, supra note 29, at 821.
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party. Because true leases are not subject to Article 9, the lessor has
the right to return of the goods upon the lessee's default or at the end
of the lease term.215 As a result, the lessor's secured party, through
the derivation principle, should have similar rights as against the
debtor's secured party.2'6
In true consignments and true bailments that are not functioning
as disguised secured financing devices, the owner's title to the con-
signed or bailed goods should present adequate rights for attachment
of a security interest. But true consignors have the additional burden
of providing public notification of their interest in the goods possessed
by the consignee.21 7 Without that notification, the consignee's credi-
tors will prevail in a priorities contest with the consignor.218 Again,
through the derivation principle the consignor's secured creditor can
stand in no better position than the consignor itselL21 9
Bailments have perplexed courts more than the other two types
of transactions. In those cases in which the bailee has been endowed
with something more than naked possession of the bailed goods,
courts have been inclined to find that the bailee had rights in the
goods sufficient for attachment of the security interest of the bailee's
secured party. In a sales context, many courts have proceeded to find
that the bailee's secured party had complete priority over the bailor,
treating the bailor's reservation of title as an unperfected security in-
terest.220 In those cases in which the bailment is viewed as a disguised
secured financing device, it is unclear whether the bailor would have
enough rights in the bailed property for attachment of a security inter-
est granted to the bailor's own secured party. Under this theory, the
bailor would have neither possession nor title22' to the goods, but
215. The UCC provides that failure to make a payment when due constitutes default.
U.C.C. § 2A-523(1) (1991). After such a default by the lessee, the lessor "has the right to
take possession of the goods." U.C.C. § 2A-525 (1991).
216. Article 2A provides in general that the lessor's secured creditors take their inter-
ests subject to the lease contract unless the security interest in the leased goods was per-
fected before the lease contract became enforceable, U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(c) (1991), or the
secured party "holds a security interest in the goods and the lessee did not give value and
receive delivery of the goods without knowledge of the security interest," id. § 2A-
307(2)(b). Moreover, a lessee in the ordinary course of business, like the buyer in the
ordinary course of business, takes its interest "free of a security interest in the goods cre-
ated by the lessor even though the security interest is perfected ... and the lessee knows of
its existence." Id. § 2A-307(3) (citations omitted).
217. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
218. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
219. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
221. Those courts that treat certain bailments as disguised financing transactions are
holding, in essence, that the bailor has sold the raw materials to the bailee and has reserved
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merely the right to retake the goods upon termination of the bail-
ment-a right that would be subordinated to a perfected secured
party's interest if the bailor did not perfect its own interest.2 2
Theoretically, a future right to possession should constitute a suf-
ficient right for attachment of a security interest. If the secured
party's ultimate interest is in having collateral that can be seized upon
the debtor's default, then the bailor's ability to retake the goods upon
termination of the bailment, if transmitted to the secured party via the
security interest, directly serves that interest. There is no apparent
policy reason why the bailor's limited interest in the goods should not
be sufficient to constitute rights in the collateral. 2 a
B. Sales Transactions
Another common and troublesome situation in which the debtor
will not have possession of goods but will arguably have some rights in
them arises in sales transactions. Suppose a debtor gives a security
interest in all its present and after-acquired inventory and equipment
to a secured party. Subsequently, the debtor orders a new piece of
equipment from a seller and signs a contract requiring delivery of the
equipment to the buyer by a certain date. At some point before or
after delivery of the new equipment the debtor defaults on its obliga-
tions to the secured party, who forecloses on the collateral. The se-
cured party would like to be able to claim the new equipment as part
of the encumbered collateral. Given the earlier existence of a written
security agreement and the secured party's extension of value, attach-
ment of the creditor's security interest will occur upon the debtor's
acquisition of rights in the new equipment.2 4
"title" in itself as a security device. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. Under
this interpretation, "title" would not represent ownership by the bailor of the goods but
merely a security interest in them.
222. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
223. Chattel paper transactions involve the debtor in the secondary transaction giving
the secured party in essence a security interest in a security interest. In the primary trans-
action, D-1 gives SP-1 a security interest in goods in exchange for an extension of credit.
In the secondary transaction, SP-1, now D-2, gives SP-2 a security interest in the install-
ment contract signed by D-1, which constitutes chattel paper. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1991).
If D-2 defaults on its obligations to SP-2, then SP-2 may foreclose on the collateral and
thereby assume whatever rights D-2 had against D-1 under the chattel paper. These rights
will include the ability to retake the hard goods upon D-1's default. See id. § 9-306(5)(a).
Thus, in effect, Article 9 already recognizes the propriety of what amounts to a security
interest in a security interest.
224. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1991) (regarding requirements for attachment of security
interests).
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The question of when the debtor acquires rights in property being
purchased in an Article 2 sales transaction dovetails with the question
of when the buyer/debtor becomes a buyer in the ordinary course of
business (BIOCOB). - A BIOCOB generally takes the goods free of
all security interests created by its seller . 2 6 Equating BIOCOB status
not only with termination of the security interest of the seller's credi-
tor but also with the buyer's acquisition of rights in the collateral for
purposes of its own secured transaction would produce a certain
cleanness and symmetry2 7 in the law.' - At the moment the seller's
secured party's security interest was cut off, the buyer's secured
party's security interest would attach. In this scheme, then, the two
secured parties would not come into direct conflict with each other,
and the security interest of the buyer's secured party would attach at
the earliest possible moment that avoids this conflict. This approach
seems to maximize the interests of both secured lenders.
In determining when a party becomes a BIOCOB, the courts
have considered various points along a temporal continuum that fol-
lows the steps in the typical sales transaction: (1) contract forma-
tion;229 (2) identification of goods to the contract;230 (3) the passage of
225. Article 1 defines "buyer in ordinary course of business" as
a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind
but does not include a pawnbroker.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1991).
226. A BIOCOB "other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1) (1991).
227. Professor Llewellyn himself valued aesthetics in law but only if they served policy
goals: "But the prime test of. . . legal beauty remains the functional test. Structural
harmony, structural grandeur, are good to have, they add, they enrich; but they are subsidi-
ary. So is ornament. Legal esthetics are in first essence functional esthetics." Karl N.
Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CI. L. REv. 224,229 (1942).
228. Of course, in some cases the debtor will not qualify for BIOCOB status because it
lacks good faith or is not buying from a merchant seller. The debtor's secured party must
still establish at what point the debtor acquired rights in the property purchased, even in a
non-ordinary course transaction. Regardless of whether the debtor qualifies for BIOCOB
status, rights in the collateral could come into existence at the same point in time in both
ordinary and non-ordinary course transactions. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1991). In the non-
ordinary course purchase, however, the security interest of the buyer's security interest
may be subordinated to the security interest of the seller's secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-
301(1)(c).
229. Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobil Am. Corp., 580 P.2d 8, 10 (Ariz. 1978); Troy Lumber Co.
v. Williams, 185 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Wilson v. M & W Gear, 442 N.E.2d
670, 674-75 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982).
230. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 B.R. 370,375-
80 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 487
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title from seller to buyer;23 (4) delivery of the goods to the buyer;23 2
and (5) acceptance of the goods by the buyer.23 3 The courts have not
arrived at any consensus on this issue, though they show particular
solicitude for a buyer who has paid all or part of the purchase price
when the seller, now insolvent, breaches the contract. 34
Professor Frisch has argued persuasively that a buyer's rights
should be defined in terms of the buyer's remedies.23 5 More specifi-
cally, he has asserted that a buyer should achieve BIOCOB status and
be able to cut off the claims of third parties to the goods when the
U.C.C. gives the buyer certain possessory remedies over the goods,
such as those under sections 2-502 and 2-716(1) and (3).236 Under
those sections, the buyer may seek to compel delivery of goods that
are unique23 7 or that have been identified to the contract in certain
circumstances that'would work a hardship to the buyer if the goods
were not delivered.23 8
A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 147-48
(R.I. 1983).
231. Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977).
232. Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 208 N.W.2d 97, 106-07 (Wis. 1973), overruled on
other grounds by Daniel v. Bank of Hayward, 425 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Wis. 1988).
233. See generally John R. Hughes, Note, When Does a Buyer Become a Buyer in Ordi-
nary Course? U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1): A Test and A Proposal, 60 NEB. L. REv. 848,
852 (1981) (discussing decisions that establish a buyer in ordinary course status at different
stages of the sales transaction).
234. See, e.g., Daniel, 425 N.W.2d at 423.
235. David Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U. C. C.: A Suggested Temporal Definition, 72
IOWA L. REv. 531, 568-75 (1987).
236. Id. at 571-72.
237. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1991) provides that "[s]pecific performance may be decreed
where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." Official Comment 2 to this
section makes it clear that to be unique, goods need not have been "already specific or
ascertained at the time of contracting." It also suggests that "other proper circumstances"
comprise situations of scarcity-i.e., when the buyer cannot cover in the market. In these
situations, contract-market damages would be inadequate to compensate the buyer for the
loss caused by the seller's breach because no adequate substitute in the market exists. See
id. §§ 2-712(2) (providing that the buyer may recover the difference between cover price
and contract price); 2-713(1) (stating that the buyer may recover the difference between
market price and contract price).
238. Under U.C.C. § 2-502(1) (1991), a buyer who has paid all or part of the purchase
price of goods that have been identified to the contract "may on making and keeping good
a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover them from the seller if the seller
becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment on their price."
Under U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (1991) a
buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after reason-
able effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reason-
ably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been shipped
under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been made
or tendered.
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Without the ability to compel delivery of specific goods, it is hard
to find that the debtor/buyer has rights in those goods as such. If the
seller breaches the contract and refuses to perform, normally the
buyer is left only with a remedy for damages and has to seek substi-
tute goods in the market.3 9 Once those substitute goods have been
procured, the security interest of the buyer's secured creditor would
attach to them. Before that time, theoretically, the secured party
would have no interest in the debtor's damages claim against the seller
unless the secured party had taken a separate security interest in the
claim as such,2 4° perhaps through an interest in the debtor's general
intangibles.
One assumption behind inventory and equipment financing is
that the secured party relies upon the debtor's possession of specific
pieces of equipment and inventory in ascertaining the amount of
credit to extend and the extent of collateralization once the loan has
been extended.241 Thus it is logical to restrict the attachment of the
creditor's security interest to those goods that the debtor presently
possesses or has the right to possess through compelling delivery by
the seller. Particularly when the debtor uses proceeds from the sale of
Id.; see also id. § 2-711(2) (reiterating buyer's possessory remedies under §§ 2-502 and 2-
716).
239. See U.C.C. § 2-712(1), (2) (1991) (allowing buyer to purchase substitute goods and
recover from seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract
price); see also id. § 2-713 (allowing buyer to recover from seller as damages the difference
between the market price and the contract price).
240. The secured party might try to argue that contract damages are proceeds of the
collateral and thus that its security interest automatically extends to them under U.C.C.
§ 9-306(2) (1991). But it is doubtful whether contract damages fit the definition of pro-
ceeds as "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of
collateral or proceeds." Id. at § 9-306(1). But see Joseph W. "arner, Note, Rights in Collat-
eral Under U.C.C. § 9-203, 54 Mo. L. REv. 677, 685 (1989) (arguing that contract damages
should be viewed as identifiable proceeds to which the inventory secured party's security
interest attaches).
If the goods had been identified to the contract before the seller's breach, however,
then the debtor would have had an insurable interest in them, whether or not the debtor
could compel delivery. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (1991). In that situation, if the goods were de-
stroyed before delivery and the seller refused to deliver substitute goods, then any insur-
ance monies paid to the debtor by virtue of the loss would fit the definition of proceeds:
"Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds .... ." Id. § 9-
306(1). Hence, insurance proceeds paid to the debtor or the secured party for identified
goods destroyed in the seller's possession could be claimed by the secured party under its
security agreement.
241. For example, a typical loan agreement might provide that the debtor agrees to
maintain inventory at a particular level in relation to the debt owed and that if the inven-
tory levels fall below a given amount, the secured party may foreclose on the collateral.
See, e.g., REiLEY, supra note 24, Form 4-20 (Inventory and Accounts Security Agreement),
at F4-48.
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encumbered inventory or equipment to purchase new items, the se-
cured creditor has a strong expectation that its security interest will
flow through to the new property.242
Identification of goods-namely, the seller's earmarking of par-
ticular goods for a specific contract-without the right to obtain pos-
session of the goods should not be sufficient to confer rights in the
collateral upon the buyer. In Crocker National Bank v. Ideco Division
of Dresser Industries,2 43 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the buyer's "special property" in goods identified to a sales contract
did not give the buyer fights in the collateral sufficient to support at-
tachment of the buyer's secured party's security interest.244 In Ideco,
the buyer had agreed to purchase forty drilling rigs from the seller but
later sought to cancel the order.245 The seller insisted that the buyer
purchase six substantially manufactured rigs.246 The seller sent in-
voices to the buyer indicating that the goods were to be "held for ship-
ping instructions" and containing an F.O.B. point of shipment term.247
Later, having found another buyer for the rigs, the seller issued a
credit memorandum canceling the buyer's indebtedness.248 During
the buyer's subsequent Chapter 11 reorganization, the buyer's secured
party sought to claim the drilling rigs.249
The appellate court found that it would be unjust to the seller to
find that the buyer's secured party had an attached and perfected se-
curity interest in the rigs superior to the seller's interest. 250 The seller
had not been paid for the goods nor had it delivered them to the
242. A security interest "continues in any identifiable proceeds ... received by the
debtor." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1991). Proceeds are defined to include "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." Id. § 9-
306(1). Therefore, if D sells encumbered inventory to a customer who pays cash, the cash
constitutes proceeds of the original collateral. If D then uses the cash to purchase addi-
tional inventory, the inventory will also constitute proceeds of the cash and thus also pro-
ceeds of the original collateral. Provided that the original inventory can be "traced" into
the new inventory (i.e., the proceeds are identifiable), the security interest should continue
to attach to the new inventory.
243. 839 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (mem.).
244. Id. at 1109.
245. Id. at 1105.
246. Id.
247. Retaining possession of the rigs during this time, the seller accounted for the trans-
action in its records as a sale. Id. at 1105-06.
248. The seller and buyer also executed a mutual release "whereby each party released
the other from all contractual obligations arising from the sale of the six rigs." Id. at 1106.
249. The secured party argued that its perfected security interest in the buyer's inven-
tory prevailed over any interest of the seller. Id.
250. Id. at 1109.
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buyer.' 5' The secured party, on the other hand, could not have relied
on those specific rigs in extending credit to the buyer because the
buyer neither possessed the rigs nor had the right to possess them.252
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Without attachment, a security interest does not exist. If a secur-
ity interest has not attached, then it is not enforceable against the
debtor, much less against a third party, such as another creditor. 3 Of
the three requirements for attachment, the first, a written security
agreement, has the most extensive policy justification. The other two
requirements, the secured party's giving of value and the debtor's hav-
ing rights in the collateral, seem more practical than policy-driven.
The written security agreement serves as a guard against fraudulently
created security interests 54 and as evidence of the specific agreement
between debtor and creditor.-55 The requirement that the secured
party give value before the security interest is enforceable follows log-
ically from the basic contract principle that an obligation is not en-
forceable unless supported by adequate consideration. Without some
251. The district court in Ideco observed, "[ilt would astonish the sellers of the world to
discover that a seller who has not parted with goods nor received payment for them has an
interest in the goods inferior to the creditor of a holder of an executory contract to buy
them." Id.
252. The court of appeals clearly regarded the buyer's possession or the right to posses-
sion of the rigs as the linchpin of rights in the collateral. Id. at 1108-09; see also First Tenn.
Bank v. Graphic Arts Centre, Inc., 859 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
identification alone does not confer rights in collateral on buyer of goods).
253. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1991). The timing of attachment may also be important for
certain priority issues under Article 9 and preference issues under the Bankruptcy Code.
One therefore needs to know not only whether the security interest has attached but when
it attached. See, e.g., Weaver v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re McFarland), 112 B.R. 906,
912 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.) (mem.) (stating that time of attachment determined whether se-
cured party had received a preferential transfer), rev'd on other grounds, 131 B.R. 627
(E.D. Tenn. 1990), afffd, 943 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1991); Union Fed. Say. Bank v. INB Banking
Co. Southwest, 582 N.E.2d 426, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that time of attachment
determined whether the secured party was "purchaser after removal" within U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i)).
254. Comment 5 to § 9-203 states that
the formal requisite of a writing stated in this section is not only a condition to the
enforceability of a security interest against third parties, it is in the nature of a
Statute of Frauds.... More harm than good would result from allowing creditors
to establish a secured status by parol evidence after they have neglected the sim-
ple formality of obtaining a signed writing.
U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 5 (1991).
255. According to the Official Comments to Article 9, "[t]he requirement of written
record minimizes the possibility of future dispute as to the terms of a security agreement
and as to what property stands as collateral for the obligation secured." Id. § 9-203 cmt. 3.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
value being given to the debtor, there is no obligation against which
the secured party can enforce the security interest.256
The requirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral as a
prerequisite to attachment of a security interest seems commonplace
and obvious-the debtor cannot give a property interest in property
in which it has no interest." 7 But, as discussed in the earlier sections
of this Article, the courts have used the concept not merely to decide
whether a creditor has an enforceable security interest in particular
collateral, but also whether the creditor has priority over a competing
claimant. This use of rights in collateral to establish priorities is not
necessarily undesirable if the results of these cases suggest that certain
transactions currently excluded from Article 9 should more properly
be subject to public notification requirements.
The bailment cases, taken at their extreme, stand for the proposi-
tion that the debtor's possession of goods coupled with almost any
other rights-e.g., the right to use the goods or to make changes to
them-will constitute rights in the collateral. s As such, they will
support attachment of the security interest of the possessor's secured
party. The resulting attachment gives the secured party priority over
the bailor/owner who has not filed a financing statement under Article
9.
By relying principally on rights in the collateral to elevate the
secured party over the bailor, courts adopt a back-door method of
deciding that the bailor's interest is in reality a security interest subject
to the Article 9 filing requirements.259 Because the bailor has not
filed a financing statement, it loses to the previously filed security in-
terest of the possessor's secured party.
A more explicit definition of rights in the collateral would pro-
duce a more efficient and equitable system than the current regime.260
256. Implicit in every secured transaction is that the secured party will resort to the
collateral only after the debtor's default-e.g., after the debtor fails to pay an installment
on the obligation. The secured party therefore seeks to enforce the security interest only
after an obligation has been created-i.e., after the creditor has lent money or otherwise
extended credit to the debtor.
257. This is not to say that the debtor cannot give a security interest in property that it
does not yet own. Security agreements predicated on after-acquired property are clearly
permitted. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1991). Section 9-203(1)(c) simply delays attachment of the
security interest until the debtor has acquired rights in the collateral.
258. See supra notes 80-131 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
260. One scholar has noted the high degree of legal certainty demanded by those en-
gaged in secured financing:
Article 9, which governs secured transactions, provides a sharp contrast to the
bipolar world of sales. The most crucial disputes arising out of Article 9 are mul-
tipolar, involving priority disputes among numerous claimants against the insuffi-
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As discussed earlier, the cases at either end of the rights spectrum
should not present much difficulty.261 If the debtor has both title to
and possession of goods, then it has rights in the property sufficient
for attachment of a security interest. In that instance the debtor has
virtually the entire quantum of rights that property law recognizes. 262
In the converse situation, when the debtor lacks title (or any other
property interest)263 and possession of goods, the debtor should not
have rights in the property adequate for attachment. In such circum-
stances, the debtor is a complete stranger to the goods, having less
connection to them than a thief, who would at least have possession.
In the middle cases, when the debtor has possession but incom-
plete ownership or when the debtor has ownership (or some other
more limited property interest) but not possession, the Code's policies
of efficiency and fairness dictate that the burdens .of inquiry and pub-
lic notification be equitably distributed between the titleholder and
would-be secured parties dealing with the debtor. These policies also
suggest that the use of equitable estoppel-with all of its nebulous
considerations and ad hoc results-should be eliminated from the in-
quiry of what constitutes rights in the collateral. To these ends, I pro-
pose that the concept of rights in the collateral be eliminated as one of
the requirements for attachment of a security interest, at least with
cient remaining assets of an insolvent debtor. In such a context, the open-ended
standards of Article 2 would be unworkable because outcomes would never be
sufficiently predictable, security interests would be insecure, and bankers (not to
mention their attorneys) would regularly suffer nervous breakdowns. Thus, Arti-
cle 9-with its detailed and carefully crafted provisions intended to resolve issues
with as high a degree of certainty as practicable-was drafted in an entirely differ-
ent style from Article 2. And when it was discovered that Article 9 had a number
of omissions, interpretative uncertainties, and contradictions, it became the first
article of the Code to undergo a complete revision, the aim of which was not to
rectify serious errors, but rather to improve clarity and answer some open
questions.
John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 375, 382 n.45 (1990).
261. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
262. Of course, even in this situation the debtor's title could be encumbered if, for
example, the debtor had earlier given a security interest to another lender. But the Code
specifically contemplates multiple security interests in the same property, and thus even an
encumbered title, when coupled with possession, should constitute rights in the collateral.
263. There are a number of situations in which the debtor will not have possession of
goods or title to them, but will have some limited property interest in them-e.g., a security
interest or lien. Article 9 acknowledges that a person with such a limited interest in goods
can give a security interest in its limited interest to a secured party. For example, if D sells
goods to B on time and reserves a security interest in them, D can then use the paper
created in the first transaction with B as collateral for a loan from SP. The second transac-
tion between D and SP involves the giving of a security interest in or the sale of chattel
paper.
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respect to security interests in tangible goods. In its place I argue that
the Code should substitute a system of filing requirements and should
rely on Article 2's existing principles regarding the ability to compel
delivery of goods in a sales transaction.
A. Ostensible Ownership Through Possession
Whenever the debtor has possession of goods, there is the danger
that third parties will be deceived into thinking that the debtor has all
right, title, and interest in those goods.264 Would-be secured creditors,
in particular, will extend credit to the debtor and take security inter-
ests in the goods, totally unaware that they are claimed by another
with an unrecorded interest.
Currently, the Code solves this ostensible ownership problem by
requiring all consignors to file financing statements under Article 9 or
otherwise give public notice of their interests.265 Conversely, it allows
lessors to rely exclusively on their reservation of title to reclaim goods
from their lessees; they are not required to file in the recording system
or cure the ostensible ownership problem by other means.266 Finally,
the courts have treated bailments in divergent ways-in some in-
stances finding bailments to be disguised financing devices requiring
filing under Article 9,267 and, in others, holding that the bailee's inter-
est in the goods was insufficient to constitute rights in the collateral
and thus that the bailee was precluded from giving a security interest
to a third party.268
This focus on rights in the collateral begs the real question:
Under what circumstances is a third party entitled to rely on the
debtor's possession of goods as an indication of ownership? In this
respect, the cases relying on equitable estoppel examine the relevant
issues. One approach places the burden of ostensible ownership
problems entirely on later third parties dealing with the debtor. Those
later third parties, most often secured creditors, would bear the re-
sponsibility of determining the state of the debtor's title to the goods
before relying on them as collateral.
In this scheme, the would-be secured party would necessarily de-
mand a bill of sale for all tangible collateral offered by the debtor,
including inventory, equipment, farm products, and consumer goods.
If the debtor could not produce a bill of sale, the secured party would
264. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
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be justified in assuming that the debtor did not own the property but
held it on a consignment, lease, bailment, or sale on approval. Con-
signors, lessors, bailors, and sellers on approval would have no obliga-
tion to file financing statements to preserve their interests, and
consequently, later secured parties could not rely on the public
records to reveal these kinds of interests.
The converse approach would require all titleholders who trans-
fer possession of their property to another to file financing statements
in the public records. Thus, all consignors, lessors, bailors, and sellers
on approval who relinquished possession of goods to the debtor would
be forced to give public notification of their interests. Later third par-
ties would be relieved of the burden of making an exhaustive inquiry
into the state of the debtor's title and could simply rely on the inter-
ests disclosed by the public recording system. If the titleholder failed
to file a proper financing statement, then the later secured party with
a perfected security interest in those goods would prevail over the ti-
tleholder's interest.
Under either of these schemes the issue of whether the debtor
had rights in the collateral would be irrelevant.269 In essence, it would
be assumed that the debtor's lawful possession of the goods endowed
it with sufficient rights for attachment of a security interest. The real
question would be that of priority to the goods, as between the title-
holder and the secured party.
Each scheme advances the Code's policies of certainty and pre-
dictability. If no titleholder must file, then secured parties know that
they must independently determine the extent of the debtor's interest
in proffered collateral. If all titleholders must file, then secured par-
ties know that they can rely exclusively on the public record to dis-
close all adverse interests in property possessed by the debtor.
Correspondingly, under either scheme titleholders know the precise
nature of their rights and responsibilities when they relinquish posses-
sion of their property to the debtor.
Both schemes, however, have associated costs with them, and
choosing between them depends on which scheme better promotes
efficiency and fairness. Putting the entire burden of inquiry on the
secured party in every instance is, of course, extremely costly for
269. The only exception to this general principle would be when the debtor was a thief.
As a thief, the debtor presumably would have possession but no underlying legal right to
possession. In that case, the common law maxim that a thief cannot pass good title to
goods even to a bona fide purchaser for value would prevail. Secured parties dealing with
thieves or their successors in interest would therefore still have to ascertain that the debtor
had lawful possession of the goods.
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would-be secured lenders. When the collateral is the debtor's inven-
tory, the inquiry could involve examining hundreds of bills of sale and
crosschecking them against the items in the debtor's possession. Even
with equipment, the task of ascertaining the debtor's rights in dozens
of individual items could be daunting.
On the other hand, requiring all titleholders to file financing
statements could be excessively burdensome, especially to lessors and
bailors who relinquish possession of their property for a short-term,
limited purpose. For example, suppose the debtor leases computers
for two months while it reviews its options for purchasing computers.
The cost of filing such transitory possessions might not be counterbal-
anced by a commensurate benefit to third parties who might rely on
the debtor's possession of the computers.
Overall, Article 9 has wisely favored distributing the burdens of
filing and inquiry evenly between earlier and later parties. Secured
parties desiring a perfected security interest must file a proper financ-
ing statement in the correct public office. 270 Later parties dealing with
the debtor can then rely upon that filing system to disclose all current
security interests.
Post-filing changes, however, can render the public record inaccu-
rate. For example, the debtor might change its name or move the col-
lateral to another state. Because the filing system is indexed by
debtors' names271 and because often the location of the collateral con-
trols the place of filing,272 such post-filing changes could make it diffi-
cult for later parties to locate the original financing statement.
In general, Article 9 divides the burdens created by post-filing
changes between the original filing creditor and the later inquiring
party. For example, if the debtor moves ordinary goods from State A
to State B, the secured party who filed in State A has four months to
discover the move and refile in State B to maintain continuous perfec-
tion. 3 As a consequence, a third party dealing with the debtor in
State B must determine that the goods in question recently arrived
270. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1991). Perfection by possession is permitted for several types
of collateral, including goods, but it is seldom used in ordinary business financing, except
for stocks, bonds, and other instruments. U.C.C. § 9-305.
271. U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
272. For "ordinary goods," perfection issues "are governed by the law of the jurisdic-
tion where the collateral is when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion that
the security interest is perfected or unperfected." U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b).
273. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i) (1991) states:
When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject to a security
interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was
removed, the security interest remains perfected, but if action is required by Part
3 of this Article to perfect the security interest,
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from State A and search for financing statements there. If the later
party is uncertain of the accuracy of the information supplied by the
debtor (e.g., perhaps the goods came from State C rather than State
A), then it may either refuse to deal with the debtor or wait four
months and then search for financing statements in State B. Similarly,
when a debtor changes its name, the original filing secured party has
four months to discover that the debtor has changed its name in a
misleading way and to refile in the new name.2 74
Even with respect to the accuracy of the original financing state-
ment, the Code puts some burdens on each party. The original filing
secured party has the primary burden of ensuring that the financing
statement is filled out correctly 75 and filed in the proper public of-
fice. 76 But the drafters recognized that some errors in filing would
inevitably occur. Thus a financing statement "substantially complying
with the requirements of [§ 9-402] is effective even though it contains
minor errors which are not seriously misleading.217 7 Therefore, a
later party searching the records must discern that a financing state-
ment with the debtor's name slightly misspelled or misstated in fact
relates to the same debtor with whom the later party is dealing.278
Similarly, a filing secured party can survive a mistake in the place of
filing: A financing statement misfiled in good faith is "effective with
regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any
person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing
statement."279
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration ofthe period of perfection
in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the collateral is brought
into this state, whichever period first expires, the security interest becomes un-
perfected at the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to have been un-
perfected as against a person who became a purchaser after removal ....
Id.
274. The four-month grace period provided for name changes is somewhat different
from that provided for interstate movements of collateral. If the debtor changes its name
in a misleading way, the original filing party must discover the name change and refile in
the debtor's new name within four months after the change to remain perfected in collat-
eral acquired more than four months after the change. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1991). Thus if
the original filer's security interest is only in two pieces of equipment, the filer need not be
concerned about a name change. This rule affects primarily inventory and accounts
financers, who rely heavily on after-acquired property.
275. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
276. U.C.C. § 9-401(1).
277. U.C.C. § 9-402(8).
278. Kay Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc. (In re McGov-
ern Auto Specialty, Inc.), 51 B.R. 511, 513-14 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Vaughan, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 61, 65 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1967).
279. U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1991).
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In one instance the Code puts the entire onus of discovering the
change in circumstances on the later party. If D transfers the collat-
eral to X, a third party, in an arms' length transaction, SP's financing
statement "remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by
the debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to the
transfer." 0 A later creditor, Y, dealing with the collateral in X's
hands cannot determine the encumbrances merely by searching for
financing statements in X's name. Instead Y must inquire as to X's
source of title to the goods and search for financing statements in the
name of X's transferor.281
The logic behind these provisions seems to be that the burdens of
ensuring the availability of accurate information about the debtor's
property are most efficiently borne by both filing and searching par-
ties. Neither party alone, without instituting costly monitoring or in-
vestigating mechanisms, can guarantee the complete reliability of the
public records. It is virtually impossible for the filing party to learn
instantly of debtor name changes or movements of collateral without
expensive daily monitoring of the debtor's activities. On the other
hand, searching parties need assurance that they can rely on the public
notification system at some point in time. The grace periods allowing
filing parties to correct the records accommodate both interests.
A similar system that divides the responsibilities of acquiring and
verifying information about property in the debtor's possession would
best serve the policies of efficiency and fairness. Titleholders (with
the exception of consignors) who relinquish possession of property to
the debtor for a limited purpose, i.e., a lease or bailment, should be
required to file financing statements to notify the world of their inter-
ests if the property remains in the debtor's possession for more than
four months. Under my proposed scheme, short-term leases and bail-
ments would not be subject to filing requirements. At the same time,
titleholders in these short-term transactions could rely on their title to
reclaim the collateral in the event of the debtor's default.
In this situation, the issue of rights in the collateral would no
longer operate as a hidden priority mechanism. Short-term lessees
and bailees could give security interests in the leased or bailed prop-
erty to creditors, but only to the extent of their limited interest in it.
Secured creditors would not be able to trump the titleholder's interest
by asserting that they had attached, perfected security interests in the
property with priority over the titleholder's unfiled interest.
280. U.C.C. § 9-402(7).
281. See U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 8.
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On the other hand, lessors and bailors who relinquish possession
of property to lessees and bailees for four months or longer would be
required to file financing statements evidencing their interests in the
leased or bailed property. In this way, later parties dealing with the
debtor could search the public records and ascertain the existence of
the titleholder's interest. These parties, if uncertain about the infor-
mation supplied by the debtor, could wait four months and then deter-
mine whether financing statements appeared on the public records.
Again, under this regime, the issue of rights in the collateral be-
comes moot. If bailors and lessors failed to file for these longer-term
transactions, they would lose their right to claim the property as
against secured creditors who had perfected security interests in the
bailed or leased property. Debtors in this situation would be assumed
to have sufficient rights in the property for attachment of a security
interest. Bailors and lessors who did make a proper filing would be
protected against claims by secured creditors. The focus of the priori-
ties contest would be public notification, not whether the debtor had
rights in the collateral.
This scheme has several advantages for secured creditors, title-
holders, and debtors. Secured creditors gain a reliable system from
which to ascertain information about property in the debtor's posses-
sion. Many of Article 9's filing and priorities rules are predicated on
the assumption that debtors may not willingly provide accurate infor-
mation to third parties about the extent of their ownership interests in
property in their possession. 2  By requiring titleholders in longer-
term transactions to file in the public notification system, one ensures
later third parties that they can discover the status of the possessor's
interest in certain personal property without having to rely on possibly
inaccurate or self-serving information supplied by the possessor.
283
282. If the secured party
leaves the property in the debtor's possession and under his apparent control, the
debtor will be given a false credit and will be enabled to sell the property to
innocent purchasers or to induce other innocent persons to lend money to him on
the strength of his apparently unencumbered assets.
1 GILMORE, SECURITY IrNrEmsS, supra note 24, §14.1, at 438.
283. One argument against including lessors and bailors in the filing system is that later
third parties can easily ascertain whether the debtor has title to the leased or bailed goods
by demanding a bill of sale before proceeding with the transaction. However, this argu-
ment overlooks the possibility that the debtor will provide a phony bill of sale, as well as
the burdens attendant to examining bills of sale for all pieces of equipment in the debtor's
possession. Theoretically, third parties dealing with debtors who may have consigned
goods in their possession have the same option of demanding bills of sale, yet the Code
requires all consignors to give public notification to protect their interests. See U.C.C. § 2-
326(3) (1991).
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At the same time, titleholders gain much greater certainty as to
their responsibilities under the U.C.C. Under the present system,
bailors in particular are unsure about when their bailments will be
treated as disguised secured transactions and brought within the ambit
of the Code's filing requirements. As a prophylactic matter, many
bailors may already file financing statements, even in short-term
transactions. This proposal removes from short-term bailors the bur-
den of expense and filing.
The choice of four months as the determining point for filing
meshes with the existing four-month grace periods in Article 9. Se-
cured parties interested in a debtor's inventory or equipment cannot
be certain that there are no conflicting security interests in those
goods even after consulting the public records because those records
may not reflect the most recent information regarding the debtor's
name or the location of the collateral.2s4 As a result, to guarantee the
accuracy of information found in the filing system, secured creditors
must again search the records regarding the same collateral four
months after the initial search. In this way, searching creditors ensure
that an earlier creditor with a perfected security interest in the collat-
eral has not refiled in the debtor's new name or in the collateral's new
location.
Requiring that bailors and lessors file financing statements when
bailed or leased goods have been in the debtor's possession for four
months or more allows searching creditors to wait four months and
then check for filings made by bailors or lessors. Searching creditors
gain this additional information not currently provided by the Article
9 scheme without undertaking significant new burdens.
The four-month time limit also protects bailors and lessors in
short-term transactions from compliance with filing requirements.
The transitory nature of the debtor's possession probably does not jus-
tify imposing the costs of filing on these titleholders.285 For example,
a titleholder who routinely sends its equipment to bailees for one-
month stints for repair or refurbishment would find it extremely bur-
densome to fie a financing statement for each of these temporary sit-
uations. Similarly, lessors in short-term leases already have high
transaction costs because of the rapid turnover of the equipment,2 86
284. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
285. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALB L.J. 1143, 1158-61 (1979) (noting that costs of engaging in se-
cured financing may outweigh the benefits to creditors where loan is small or duration of
loan is short).
286. Every time a short-term lease ends, the lessor has to retake the property, clean and
refurbish it, and find another lessee. In a short-term lease, moreover, the lessor is more
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and adding filing costs would further reduce the profitability of these
transactions. 87
On the other hand, longer-term bailments and leases are more
likely to be akin to secured financing transactions. In a long-term
bailment, the bailor often provides raw materials to a bailee to manu-
facture into a finished product. 8 The bailor supplies raw materials in
lieu of lending the bailee funds to buy its own raw materials.289 Long-
term leases are similarly used as a substitute for installment sales con-
tracts for the purchase of equipment and, thus, are the functional
equivalent of a secured financing device.2 90 Just as the classic secured
transaction creates ostensible ownership problems, long-term bail-
ments and leases can result in similar third-party deception. This po-
tential deception justifies placing the burdens of filing on long-term
bailors and lessors.
This proposed scheme could also be applied to consignment
transactions. As mentioned previously, all consignors, whether en-
gaged in true or security consignments, must give some sort of public
notice of their interests to protect the consigned goods from the claims
of the consignee's creditors.291 The question arises as to whether,
under my proposal, short-term consignors should be relieved of public
notification burdens as are short-term bailors and lessors.
Inventory financers often must monitor their debtors closely to
ensure that the debtors maintain the proper levels of inventory and
remit proceeds.29 They must also keep abreast of name changes by
the debtor and movements of the collateral across jurisdictional lines.
These events trigger refiling obligations by the original secured
party.293 In fact, the original secured party must monitor these factors
at least every four months to avoid losing its perfected status.
likely to be responsible for ongoing maintenance and insurance costs than in a long-term
transaction.
287. For example, using a similar cost-benefit analysis, the Truth-in-Lending Act ex-
empts leases of personal property for four months or less from the extensive disclosure
requirements mandated for longer-term leases. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667(1), 1667a (1988).
288. See, e.g., Litwiller Mach. & Mfg., Inc. v. NBD Alpena Bank, 457 N.W.2d 163, 164-
65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210,211-12
(Okla. 1977).
289. See Summers, supra note 118, at 451-54.
290. Long-term leases not terminable by the lessee which are for the duration of the
useful life of the goods are presumptively secured transactions and covered by Article 9.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) (defining security interest), 9-102(2) (describing the scope of Arti-
cle 9) (1991).
291. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
292. For example, the secured party can lose its security interest in proceeds that be-
come nonidentifiable. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1991); CLARK, supra note 22, 10.3.
293. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
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Arguably then, inventory secured creditors face a minimal addi-
tional burden in determining whether the debtor is holding on con-
signment particular goods that appear to be part of its inventory. In
actuality, however, the burden on secured creditors in this instance is
considerable. Monitoring the remitting of proceeds, the general levels
of inventory, the debtor's name, and the collateral's location, while
tedious no doubt, can be accomplished in a relatively straightforward
fashion. Determining the exact arrangement between the debtor and
its supplier regarding hundreds of items of inventory, on the other
hand, potentially involves close daily observation of the minute details
of the debtor's business.
At present, the Code recognizes the considerable difficulties
faced by inventory financers in determining the existence of compet-
ing claims to their debtor's inventory. The rules regarding consign-
ments and the purchase money inventory superpriority implicitly
acknowledge the original inventory secured party's substantial moni-
toring problems. The consignor and the purchase money inventory
secured party both gain priority over an earlier perfected inventory
secured party if they file financing statements in a timely fashion and
give individual written notification to the earlier secured party of their
interests.294 The individual written notification relieves the original
secured creditor of the task of frequently consulting the public records
for new claimants or investigating the debtor's arrangements with its
suppliers. In this scheme, the Code recognizes the significant burden
that would be imposed on original inventory secured parties if they
were not directly apprised of the later party's superseding interest.295
Notwithstanding the inventory financer's special vulnerabilities,
my four-month notification proposal could be used for certain types of
consignments. For example, art galleries, antique shops, craft outlets,
and jewelry stores often sell unique goods received on consignment
from individual artisans or collectors. Because third parties dealing
with these types of sellers will likely know that much of their inven-
tory is held on consignment, the statutory scheme could relieve the
294. U.C.C. §§ 9-114(1), 9-312(3) (1991).
295. Official Comment 3 to § 9-312 justifies the notification requirement:
The reason for the additional requirement of notification is that typically the ar-
rangement between an inventory secured party and his debtor will require the
secured party to make periodic advances against incoming inventory or periodic
releases of old inventory as new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may
apply to the secured party for advances even though he has already given a secur-
ity interest in the inventory to another secured party. The notification require-
ment protects the inventory financer in such a situation: if he has received
notification, he will presumably not make an advance ....
U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 3 (1991).
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consignors of the public notification requirements unless the con-
signed goods were in the dealer's possession for more than four
months. The consignors in this setting-i.e., artists and craftspeople-
are less likely to have the resources and expertise to use the filing
system. Arguably, these consignors should be relieved of all public
notification requirements because the benefit to third parties does not
outweigh the considerable burdens on the consignors.
B. Ownership Without Possession
1. Leases, Consignments, and Other Bailments
Titleholders in lease, consignment, and bailment transactions are
concerned not only about being able to reclaim their goods from the
possessor but also about being able to grant security interests in these
goods to their own lenders. The earlier discussion suggests that under
Article 9's current provisions titleholders do have sufficient rights in
the goods to give an enforceable security interest in them to a secured
party.296
If rights in the coliateral is eliminated as a requirement for attach-
ment of a security interest in tangible goods, one must then determine
the enforceability of a security interest given by a titleholder to goods
it does not presently possess. Again there is no particular reason why
a lender should not be able to take a security interest in, for example,
a lessor's interest in leased goods.297 Often the lender will want a se-
curity interest primarily in the rental payments and only secondarily in
the leased goods themselves. The lender's security interest in the
goods, however, would be limited by the lessor's interest in them; that
is, the lessor generally has no right to retake the goods until the lease
term ends or the lessee defaults.
Arguably, this situation presents no ostensible ownership
problems for third parties dealing with the lessor.298 Third parties
cannot be deceived by appearances into believing that the lessor owns
certain goods because it possesses them, for here the leased goods are
assumed to be in the lessee's hands. On the other hand, the lessor
may convince a would-be lender that it in fact owns the leased
296. See supra notes 213-23 and accompanying text.
297. See U.C.C. § 2A-303 (1991) (providing that the transfer or creation of security
interests either in the lessee's interest under the lease or of the lessor's residual interest is
enforceable, notwithstanding a provision in the lease agreement prohibiting the transfer or
making it a default).
298. This analysis could apply equally as well to consignments and other bailments.
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goods299 and eventually will retake them.300 The lender at that point
must be able to ascertain whether there are pre-existing security inter-
ests in the goods. Thus, it seems appropriate that secured parties de-
siring to have perfected security interests in both the lease payments
and the leased goods should be required to file financing statements
covering both.30 1
2. Sales Transactions
The issue of rights in the collateral in sales transactions can be
used to determine priority between the seller of the goods (or the
seller's secured party) and the buyer's secured party. If the buyer has
the right to obtain physical possession of the goods, one could say that
it has rights in the collateral such that the security interest of the
buyer's secured party attaches. At the moment that the buyer ac-
quires its rights, one could say that the seller loses its rights (assuming
the buyer is a buyer in the ordinary course of business) and the secur-
ity interest of the seller's secured party thereby detaches or is cut off.
Again, the use of rights in the collateral or the BIOCOB rule is
simply a way to determine priority between two "innocent" parties-
namely, the unpaid (or partially paid) seller and the (presumably) un-
paid secured party of the buyer. As Professor Frisch persuasively ar-
gued, Article 2, by giving the buyer certain possessory remedies in the
event of the seller's default, seeks to validate legitimate buyer expec-
tations regarding the goods.3° If the goods in question are fungible,
then the buyer has no need of the specific goods promised by the
seller and will gladly accept market damages as a substitute.30 3 With
those damages, the buyer can re-enter the market and purchase iden-
tical substitute goods. Only when substitute goods cannot be ob-
299. The lessor may show the lender its lease with the lessee to establish its ownership
and may demonstrate that its primary business is leasing of equipment.
300. In a long-term lease, the useful life of the leased goods may be rather short at the
end of the lease term. In those cases, the lessor's secured party may be more interested in
the rental payments and less interested in the leased goods themselves, except as back-up
collateral in case the lessee defaults during the term.
301. See Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 486 F.2d
367, 370-72 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that party desiring perfected security interest in lessor's
reversionary interest in leased goods had to file financing statement against the goods qua
goods and could not rely only on filing as to chattel paper).
302. Frisch, supra note 235, at 570-71.
303. Frisch noted that
[a] central assumption of Article 2 is the homogeneity of goods. If the seller does
not deliver the goods, the buyer will, most often, be able to obtain similar goods
elsewhere. As a result, the buyer's expectation interest is fully vindicated by a
damages award based on an imagined or actual substitute purchase.
Id. at 571 (footnotes omitted).
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tained, or when a damages remedy would be relatively valueless
because of the seller's insolvency, does the buyer prefer to have the
specific goods promised by the seller.? 4
In some sense, the buyer's secured party's expectations track
those of the buyer. The secured creditor with a security interest in the
buyer-debtor's present and after-acquired equipment and inventory
legitimately expects that it can foreclose on all items currently in the
debtor's possession. It would also assume that it could foreclose on
any items that are not currently in the debtor's possession but that the
debtor has the right to possess under certain circumstances-e.g.,
leased goods that can be reclaimed from the lessee. Thus, if Article 2
affords the buyer certain possessory remedies in sales transactions, the
buyer's secured party would expect to be able to take advantage of
those remedies as it stands in the buyer's shoes.3 5
Assuming that the current Article 2 remedies strike an appropri-
ate balance between the seller's and buyer's interests, it therefore
seems logical to equate the buyer's right to possession of goods in a
sales transaction with the attainment of fights in the collateral suffi-
cient for attachment.306 But again one observes that rights in the col-
lateral operate as a priority-giving mechanism; that is, to say that the
buyer has rights in the goods being purchased is to say that the secur-
ity interest attaches and that the seller's interest in the goods is essen-
tially stripped away. This result could be accomplished directly by
doing away with rights in the collateral and substituting a priority rule
304. Id. at 571-72.
305. In some cases, the foreclosing secured party may choose not to avail itself of the
buyer's possessory remedies under Article 2. For example, to compel the seller to deliver
goods under U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1991) (describing buyer's right to specific performance),
the buyer may be required to tender the balance of the purchase price. See U.C.C. § 2-
716(2) ("The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to
payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just."). The buyer's
secured party may prefer to keep the cash and forego obtaining the goods if it plans on
selling the goods anyway.
306. Several of the early drafts of Article 9 defined rights in the collateral for certain
types of property. In particular, the debtor had "no interest... in goods to be purchased
by the debtor until they [were] tendered (defined in Sales Article) Section 2-503." U.C.C.
§ 9-203(2)(c) (1950), reprinted in 11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Drafts 229 (Elizabeth
Slusser Kelly ed. 1984). Under the 1950 version of § 2-503, "[t]ender of delivery requires
that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer
any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time
and place for tender are determined by the agreement and this Article ... ." U.C.C. § 2-
503(1) (1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: Drafts, supra, at 195. When
§§ 2-401, concerning passage of title, and 2-503 are read together with § 9-203(2)(c), it
becomes apparent that the drafters intended that title to goods should pass from buyer to
seller upon the seller's tender of them to the buyer and that thus the buyer/debtor did not
have an "interest" in goods being purchased for Article 9 purposes until title passed.
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that states that a secured party whose debtor-buyer has a possessory
right in goods purchased in a sales transaction prevails over a seller
seeking to retain or reclaim those goods .3 7
V. CERTAINTY, EFFICIENCY, AND REALISM
Legal scholars have frequently observed the impact of Karl Llew-
ellyn's jurisprudential philosophy on the formulation of the Uniform
Commercial Code.30 As the Chief Reporter for the U.C.C. pro-
ject,3m  Llewellyn was in a unique position to shape commercial law
according to his view of the proper role of law in society. By his own
admission, he sought to create a "case law" code in contrast to the
more prescriptive civil codes of the European Continent.310 He fore-
saw the courts as having a significant function in filling in the doctrinal
gaps left by the Code's drafters and in updating the Code to fit chang-
ing and perhaps unanticipated business conditions.
As one of the foremost advocates of Legal Realism, 31' Llewellyn
also endeavored to engineer the Code to reflect the actual practices of
reasonable business people. The body of commercial law, he be-
lieved, should not represent an artificial construct born of some legal
academic's utopian vision of the ideal commercial world. 2 It should
307. The seller has a limited right of reclamation of goods that have already been deliv-
ered to a buyer where the buyer has misrepresented its solvency to the seller. U.C.C. § 2-
702(2) (1991). The seller must demand return of the goods within 10 days of the buyer's
receipt of them unless the "misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within three months before delivery." Id. The seller's right of reclamation
is subject to the rights of good faith purchasers, which have been interpreted to include
Article 9 secured parties. Id. § 702(3); see Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co.
(In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1984); Stowers v. Mahon (In re
Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976);
In re Shattue Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557,562-63 (Bankr. N.D. IU. 1992); House of Stainless,
Inc. v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 249 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Wis. 1977).
308. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 81-86 (1977) [hereinafter
GILMORE, AGES]; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
302-40 (1973); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 621-22 (1975); John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Tak-
ing a Realist Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 342-43 (1988); Zipporah
Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
HARV. L. REV. 465, 466-72 (1987).
309. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1967) (referring to Llewellyn as the
"outstanding man in the United States" to serve as Chief Reporter).
310. See TWINING, supra note 308, at 305.
311. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
312. See Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM.
ECON. REV. 665, 665-72 (1925).
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be grounded instead in real-life business mores and customs, which
have developed in response to the felt necessities of commercial inter-
action in a capitalist economy. Commercial actors in the real world
are in a much better position to create trade customs that reduce risks
and promote efficiency than remote lawgivers.
Llewellyn's vision of a case-law Code grew out of his realist juris-
prudence.313 He foresaw that the Code, like any statute, could be-
come woefully outmoded in a relatively short period of time as new
business practices arose and old ones vanished.314 Rather than relying
on the cumbersome process of legislative amendment, he envisioned
the courts adapting the Code to changing circumstances. Because
courts decide cases in the context of specific facts, Llewellyn believed
that they were well situated to modernize the statutory dictates315 and
to prevent the Code from becoming fossilized in a bygone mercantile
era.
3 16
Llewellyn's influence on the Code can be seen most starkly in
Article 2's open-ended style. Article 2 is replete with phrases such as
"reasonable, ' 317  "good faith,"318 "unconscionable, ' 3 19  "conspicu-
313. GiLMORE, AGES, supra note 308, at 85-86.
314. Llewellyn believed that commercial or mercantile law, in particular, ran the risk of
being outstripped by societal and economic changes: "Nowhere does the eternal legal
problem lie closer, of making antiquated and clumsy words and concepts do more delicate
and modem work.... ." Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HIARv. L. REv.
725, 727 (1939).
315. Llewellyn favored what he called the "Grand Style" of decisionmaking, which he
believed characterized the American courts of the early nineteenth century. Under the
Grand Style,
every current decision is to be tested against life-wisdom, and ... the phrasing of
authorities which build our guiding structure of rules is to be tested and is at need
to be vigorously recast in the new light of what each new case may suggest either
about life-wisdom, or about a cleaner and more usable structure of doctrine. In
any event, and as overt marks of the Grand Style: "precedent" is carefully re-
garded, but if it does not make sense it is ordinarily re-explored; "policy" is ex-
plicitly inquired into; alleged "principle" must make for wisdom as well as for
order if it is to qualify as such ....
KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACrICE 217 (1962).
316. Llewellyn noted both the narrowness and adaptability of judicial lawmaking:
Rulings of wider import are made by the courts always under the impact of the
concrete controversy .... This serves at once to test and refresh rules of law by
recurrent earthy contact with new experience ... while, on the other hand, it
serves to hold vision and thought down to small areas and to condition thought by
the partially accidental impact of what happens to be litigated.
Karl Llewellyn, American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy, 1 J. LEGAL
& POL. SOC. 14, 30 (1942).
317. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1991) (defining good faith); § 2-305(4) (construing
an open price term); § 2-309 (construing the absence of specific time provisions relating to
performance); § 2-606(1)(a), (b) (defining acceptance of goods); § 2-610(a) (providing for
anticipatory repudiation); § 2-706 (permitting seller's resale).
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ous,"3 2 0 "course of dealing,"'3 2 1 and "usage of trade" 32 2 -phrases that
by themselves carry little meaning32 but can be fleshed out only when
a court decides their meaning in the context of specific cases. Article
2 also allows the parties to sales transactions great latitude in varying
the Code provisions by contract.3 24 Through the open-ended drafting
style and the deference to freedom of contract, Article 2 could be
adapted to the vast assortment of different sales transactions and
could allow the parties maximum flexibility in tailoring the basic statu-
tory provisions to their particular circumstances.
Article 9, in contrast, felt Llewellyn's influence less keenly.
Drafted primarily by Grant Gilmore and Allison Dunham,32  it is
much more tightly written and more prescriptive than Article 2.326
Article 9's great achievement was its development of a unitary secur-
ity device controlled by a few basic requirements-a single model for
secured transactions that replaced the plethora of pre-Code security
devices such as the trust receipt and the chattel mortgage.3 27 Rather
318. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (construing provisions related to output, requirements
and exclusive dealings); § 2-311(1) (concerning options and cooperation respecting per-
formance); § 2-403(1) (regarding title acquired by good faith purchaser).
319. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (describing judicial options for remedying unconscionable
contracts); § 2-719(3) (providing for limitations on exclusion of consequential damages).
320. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (discussing modification or exclusion of implied
warranties).
321. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208 (describing interpretation of contract terms); § 2-314 (pro-
viding for implied warranties).
322. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (describing interpretation of contract terms); § 2-314(3)
(providing for implied warranties).
323. "Good faith," "course of dealing," and "trade usage" are loosely defined in Article
1. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (defining good faith); § 1-205 (defining course of dealing and
trade usage). "Good faith" is further defined as to merchants in Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-
103(1)(b).
324. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105 (granting the parties choice of law right); § 2-316 (permit-
ting the exclusion or modification of warranties); § 2-319 (providing default definition of
F.O.B. and F.A.S. terms); § 2-401(2) (specifying default rule for passage of title); § 2-719
(providing for limitation or modification of remedies).
325. 1 GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS, supra note 24, at xi. TWo lawyers, Homer
Kripke and Peter Coogan, also made substantial contributions during the drafting process.
Id.
326. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 308, at 140-41 n.38; Sebert, supra note 260, at 382
n.45.
327. Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 27 (1951) ("Article 9... proposes to integrate, under a single
system of legal propositions and a single system of terminology, the entire range of transac-
tions in which money debts are secured by personal property."); see also Homer Kripke &
Carl Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions: A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 168, 168 (1962) (noting that Article 9 "creates a
uniform system for handling most forms of security devices heretofore covered by a bewil-
dering variety of statutes and common law principles").
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than emphasizing variety and flexibility, the drafters of Article 9 at-
tempted to focus on similarities among secured transactions and to
create certainty with respect to the rights and interests of the various
affected parties.-3  As a result, there is much less room for courts or
private parties to maneuver under Article 9-much less opportunity
for courts to fill in statutory gaps or to interpret vague statutory lan-
guage and fewer chances for the parties to opt out of the Code scheme
by contract. 29
With respect to the issue of rights in collateral, Article 9 reads
more like Article 2. Article 9 specifically fails to define that phrase
and leaves the courts to find its meaning.330 But the courts have been
inconsistent and often misguided in their interpretation of what con-
stitutes sufficient rights in the collateral for attachment of an Article 9
security interest.331 Parties in bailment and sales transactions are left
to speculate what their obligations, if any, under Article 9 might be.
The courts' use of equitable estoppel to decide some of these cases
leads them to heavily fact-laden inquiries and subjective judgments
about what would be a "fair" result.332
Given that the phrase "rights in the collateral" was left deliber-
ately vague, one could argue that the Code drafters intentionally and
wisely left the issue to the courts, that they realized that in borderline
cases equitable concerns would properly weigh in the balance. But
everything about Article 9's history suggests the contrary-that the
drafters wanted to favor the policy of certainty wherever it conflicted
with the policy of flexibility.333 Unlike Article 2, which focuses on
two-party relationships, Article 9 is concerned with multiple-party sit-
uations involving, at a minimum, the debtor, the secured party, and a
328. Thomas H. Jackson & Ellen A. Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flex-
ible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907, 909 (1978).
329. Professor Gilmore pointed out that contemporary statutes tended to be more
tightly written than those of the past. As such, they left less room for the courts to mold
them to fit new situations: "Modem statutes are much less susceptible to judicial manipu-
lation. An unexpected change in the business cycle might leave the courts powerless until
the complicated mechanisms of the state and federal legislatures could be set in remedial
motion." Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046
(1961).
330. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 46-252 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 158-212 and accompanying text.
333. No doubt the drafters wanted to create flexibility in certain areas under Article 9.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1991) (concerning the creditor's ability to dispose of the collat-
eral after default). It is clear, however, that Article 9's main goal was to clarify the confus-
ing pre-Code law governing personal property security devices so as "to make the taking of
security easy, cheap, and certain." Gilmore, Secured Transactions, supra note 327, at 36.
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competing claimant of some stripe. The competing claimant and the
secured party need to know not only where they stand vis-A-vis the
debtor but also where they stand relative to each other. By creating
some level of certainty about relative priorities among conflicting
claimants, Article 9 reduces risks associated with secured lending and
promotes the availability of credit to a wide array of debtors. 34
The treatment of rights in the collateral in open-ended, Article 2
fashion has produced certain anomalies in Article 9's supposedly
straightforward priority scheme. My proposal to eliminate this con-
cept as it pertains to tangible goods and to substitute a system of filing
requirements would remove the anomalies and increase certainty and
efficiency in certain transactions in which possession and ownership
are separated. At the same time, my proposal is consistent with Karl
Llewellyn's view of the proper role of the courts and with his realist
jurisprudence.
Llewellyn conceded that the courts and the legislature must work
together in leap-frog style to advance the law. In creating a commer-
cial code, the legislature basically codifies the existing common law
regarding commercial transactions, smoothing out inconsistencies
where possible and selecting the most workable of divergent common
law rules. 35 The courts are left with the task, in applying the code to
real-life fact situations, of interpreting the amorphous provisions and
pouring content into the statutory lacunae.336 Over the years, a body
of case law construing the code will develop-some of it contradic-
tory, some of it bad policy.3 37 At that point, Llewellyn believed, the
legislature should again intervene to refine the statute in light of the
intervening case law developments, winnowing out the bad rules and
clarifying the ambiguities where appropriate.3 s
334. See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 60 (1983) (observing level of informational certainty provided to se-
cured creditors by notice-filing system and resultant priority rules); James J. White, Effi-
ciency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473, 502-08 (1984)
(arguing that secured financing in general and Article 9 in particular are efficient).
335. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 66-67 (1989).
336. Id. at 67 ("Once a statute is adopted .... there is room again for the case law
method, for only through it can legislative insight be elaborated, corrected, and perfected
in light of the subsequent, unforeseen cases.").
337. Llewellyn railed against case-law rules that did not foster some degree of predict-
ability and certainty: "there is still an unnecessary quantum of irregularity, unreck-
onability, gamble about the results of cases on appeal.... [Tihe quantum of gamble that
remains is in one sense shocking. I speak not of healthy uncertainty .... I speak of
unnecessary uncertainty, of variances avoidable by human care and human skill." KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION: DECIDING APPEALS 336 (1960).
338. LLEWELLYN, supra note 335, at 103.
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The issue of rights in the collateral is ripe for legislative interven-
tion. The original provision, through its vagueness, has led courts to
interpret it in divergent and unsound ways. The Akrticle 9 revision
process, already underway, presents the ideal opportunity to examine
this issue afresh in light of the intervening case law and to create a
rule that better promotes efficiency and certainty in secured
transactions.
Llewellyn's realist bent towards examining the actual practices of
real-world commercial actors as the basis for creating legal rules also
dictates that section 9-203(1)(c) be revised in the manner that I have
indicated. Because of the uncertain differences between true leases
and secured transactions and because of the vague nature of the
"rights in the collateral" element of attachment, parties in borderline
transactions already file financing statements to protect their interests
in the event that they are construed to hold an Article 9 security inter-
est in the debtor's property.33 9 Similarly, inventory secured parties
may attempt to claim goods still held by the debtor's seller on the
theory that they have been identified to the contract. Because of the
needless nebulousness of one of the elements of attachment, parties
must undertake the expense of litigation to determine their rights.
Given that the courts have shown no inclination to construe rights in
the collateral in a consistent way, the issue may have to be litigated
repeatedly.
Arguably then, the current rule of law causes commercial actors
to behave inefficiently, through unnecessary filings and repeated liti-
gation. Because of the great need for certainty in secured transac-
tions, even Llewellyn, with his fondness for open-ended code
provisions, might concede that the current system should be revised in
light of the real world response.
My proposal for eliminating the requirement of rights in the col-
lateral as an element of attachment when the collateral is tangible
goods will certainly not banish litigation in this area. If lessors, con-
signors, and bailors must file financing statements only when their
property has been in the debtors' possession for more than four
months, parties will no doubt argue over when the debtor acquired
possession of the property. But parties to these transactions will find
planning easier-no longer will they have to guess whether their lease
or bailment is subject to Article 9 filing requirements. Third parties
dealing with the debtor will have the assurance that once property has
339. Kripke, supra note 47, at 801; see also U.C.C. § 9-408 (1991) (allowing the filing of
a precautionary financing statement by lessors and consignors).
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been in the debtor's possession more than four months, they are safe
in assuming that there are no other interests in it unless the filing sys-
tem discloses them., Similarly, inventory secured financers will know
that it is useless to try to claim goods held by the debtor's seller unless
the goods have been identified to the contract and the debtor has the
right to replevy them under Article 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
The very earliest drafts of Article 9 did not include a provision
regarding rights in the collateral. 34 It was only later that the drafters
felt the need to insert the self-evident proposition that a security inter-
est cannot be enforceable against the collateral unless the debtor has
some interest in that property. A debtor without any rights whatso-
ever in particular property cannot give away an interest in that prop-
erty to another. But, however benign that proposition seems on its
face, over the years the courts have used it in ways probably not
imagined by the original drafters. In particular, the concept of rights
in the collateral, as it relates to tangible goods, has become a mecha-
nism for according priority between two or more claimants to specific
goods.
This Article has suggested that the confusion and uncertainty
generated by case-law interpretation of this concept can best be re-
lieved by removing rights in the collateral from the required elements
of attachment of security interests in tangible goods. As a substitute
for this concept, a set of specific priority and filing rules for various
transactions involving tangible goods should be adopted. In this way,
it is hoped that Article 9 will gain in clarity, certainty, efficiency, and
fairness-principles that have informed the Uniform Commercial
Code since its inception.
340. See, e.g., Commercial Code Art. VII, § 306 (1948), reprinted in 5 UNIFORM COM.
MERCIAL CODE: Drafts 136 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed. 1984) (specifying formal requisites
for an inventory lien).
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